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"It is a characteristic of the worst crimes of the period since 1930 that they
have been committed within and with the assistance of State structures .... 
INTRODUCTION
They call it basat al-reeh (flying carpet). It is a custom-built wooden
cross with a hinge in the middle. As Syrian survivors describe it, those torturing
the survivors would tie them down on the cross, then force the two halves of
the cross together, crushing the detainee inside.2 Basat al-reeh has been used
systematically across state-run detention sites throughout Syria, with instruc-
tions on its use disseminated through the state apparatus and information on the
implementation of those instructions sent back through a multi-nodal chain of
command.3
The Syrian program of torture is just a recent example of what this Article
calls State-Enabled Crimes. The term describes a subset of international crimes
characterized by critical involvement of the state apparatus. While it is individ-
uals who act, it is the integrated contribution of individual and state that is in-
trinsic to the commission of these crimes. In concrete terms, this means that in
the Syrian example, for instance, even removing President Bashar al-Assad
himself from power-let alone simply prosecuting some of the individual per-
petrators below him-is unlikely to stop the torture. Unless the state policies
and practices enabling these crimes are also addressed, the torture program will
almost certainly continue, albeit with a different set of individual perpetrators.
Notwithstanding this reality, the international legal system rarely re-
sponds to such crimes by focusing on the state's role in creating and maintain-
ing such policies and practices. Moreover, it almost never attempts to address,
in any coherent way, the dual responsibility of individual and state that is so
characteristic of these crimes. Instead, the international enforcement system is
structured so as to artificially isolate these two sources of responsibility. And
when it comes to adjudicative mechanisms of enforcement, the system focuses
almost exclusively on the responsibility of individuals. This generates a distort-
ed picture of how these crimes are committed, with resulting inaccuracy and
unfairness in the allocation of legal consequences. This in turn undermines the
international legal system's ability to deliver on its normative goals, regardless
of one's theory of justice.
The prosecution of individuals for international crime, made possible
1. James Crawford (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), First Rep. on State Respon-
sibility, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/490/Add.3 (1998).
2. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TORTURE ARCHIPELAGO: ARBITRARY ARRESTS, TORTURE,
AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN SYRIA'S UNDERGROUND PRISONS SINCE MARCH 2011 (2012),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/03/torture-archipelago/arbitrary-arrests-torture-and-enforced-disap
pearances-syrias.
3. See COMM'N FOR INT'L JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
COMMITTED IN SYRIAN REGIME DETENTION FACILITIES (on file with author); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 2; Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic, IM 92-93, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011).
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through the advent of international criminal law, has been lauded as one of the
greatest advances in international law of the twentieth century.4 Nonetheless, a
significant body of scholarship has questioned the suitability of international
criminal law as the "first-best" response to international crime.5 This scholar-
ship, however, has two major holes. First, although much of the power of its
critique comes from its acknowledgement of situational factors - influences on
individual action that stem from sources external to the individual,6 this schol-
arship has thus far failed to focus on the state's legal responsibility for estab-
lishing and maintaining the policies and practices that perpetuate these situa-
tional factors. Second, it has not seriously questioned the structure of the
existing adjudicative system. The result has been an absence of consideration,
let alone of concrete proposals, about whether and how the mechanisms for ad-
judicating individual responsibility could be adapted to also hold the state to
account.
This Article introduces an analytical category, State-Enabled Crimes, to
draw attention to the fact that, notwithstanding a deep interrelationship between
individual and state in the commission of State-Enabled Crimes, the interna-
tional legal system adjudicates the responsibility of each under two entirely
separate structures. One side of the system deals with state responsibility, the
other with individual criminal responsibility. After critiquing this bifurcated
approach, this Article advances a proposed mechanism to break through this
bifurcation and provide an integrated response to international crime.
To date, there has not only been uneven development in practice between
the adjudication of each form of responsibility, but also an almost complete
fracturing of the scholarly conversation, with a mainstream conversation fo-
cused on individual responsibility,7 a critical conversation focused on state re-
sponsibility, and precious little in the way of accommodations between the
two.9 By bridging this gap and bringing both sides concurrently into view, this
Article illuminates the fundamentally flawed structure of the existing system.
To be clear, it is not that individual accountability is unimportant; ad-
vances made in prosecuting individuals under international criminal law must
4. See, e.g., FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE (Philippe Sands ed., 2002).
5. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Crimi-
nality of Mass Atrocity, 99(2) Nw. U. L. REV. 539 (2005); Saira Mohamed, Reconciling Mass Atrocity
and the Criminal Law, 124 YALE L.J. 1628 (2015); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incen-
tives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COL. L. REV. 1751 (2005).
6. For an overview of social psychology research on situational factors that international
criminal law scholars have drawn on to question the appropriateness of focusing so heavily on individu-
al responsibility, see generally LEE Ross & RICHARD NISBETF, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (6th ed. 2011); see also Philip G. Zimbardo, Revisiting the
Stanford Prison Experiment: A Lesson in the Power of Situation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 30,
2007, at B6.
7. See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed. 2008).
8. See, e.g., STATE CRIME: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES (Dawn Rothe & Christopher Mullins
eds., 2011).
9. The one notable exception to this trend comes from a handful of Amsterdam-based schol-
ars, led by Andr6 Nollkaemper, whose work appears in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Andr6 Nollkaemper & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2009).
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not be traded away in an effort to hold states responsible. Moreover it is not
feasible, at least at this juncture, to resuscitate the notion of State Crime-the
idea of holding the state criminally liable.10 But it is also no solution to attempt
parity between the mechanisms for holding individuals and states responsible.
Any bifurcated structure, no matter how evenly balanced, will be unable to ac-
count for the integrated role of individual and state in the commission of these
crimes. I argue instead for a wholesale re-imagining of the way we discuss and
respond to State-Enabled Crimes.
This Article develops a proposal for integrating the existing law of state
responsibility-the body of law enabling states to hold other states civilly liable
for acts and the acts of state agents-into International Criminal Court (ICC)
proceedings against individuals for international crimes where state policies
and practices have played an essential role. While the details are fleshed out
further below, the contours of the mechanism are straightforward. The trial
court hearing the case would develop a factual record sufficient to adjudicate
not only individual criminal liability, but also non-criminal state liability. If
state responsibility is found, then the ICC would make a reparations order
against the state. Such an order could take an array of forms, both monetary and
symbolic, and could be specifically targeted toward reform of the policies and
practices that enabled the crimes.
This Article focuses on how the international legal system responds to
State-Enabled Crimes. The precursor to this, however, asks what the justifica-
tion is for responding at all. The main justifications advanced can be catego-
rized into three groups: peace and reconciliation, prevention,12 and retribu-
tion.13 These goals-both their appropriateness and the degree to which they
are or can be achieved-are highly contested, and the value of one goal over
another is not central to this Article.14 My goal, rather, is to argue that the ex-
isting system for responding to State-Enabled Crimes inadequately advances
the goals that its proponents suggest and that an integrated response would ad-
vance their goals more effectively.
10. See infra page 310.
I1. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (2001). The possibility of creating an accurate historical record
through the trial process is touted as a way of contributing to future peace and reconciliation. See, e.g.,
GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 302-04
(2000).
12. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1996). The expression of norms condemning such crimes
is also thought to serve prevention. See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing To Prosecute: Expres-
sive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265 (2012).
13. See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, International Criminal Law for Retributivists, 35 U.
PA. J. INT'L L. 969 (2014).
14. Indeed the trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) saw no need to limit itself in summarizing what it believed to be the United Nations Security
Council's views on the objectives of the ICTY as "general prevention (or deterrence), reprobation, retri-
bution (or 'just deserts'), as well as collective reconciliation . . . ." Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No.
IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 158 (Int'l Crim, Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996).
15. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Accountability for System Criminality, 8 SANTA CLARA J.
INT'L L. 373, 381 (2010).
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Two final points are in order before turning to the structure of the argu-
ment ahead. First, this Article focuses on the international adjudication of
State-Enabled Crimes. As such, it is concerned with the response of interna-
tional courts and tribunals, rather than quasi-judicial or political bodies like the
United Nations Security Council. There are many ways of enforcing interna-
tional law, and the characterization of the various mechanisms through which it
is enforced vary depending on one's understanding of the nature of internation-
al law itself. Beyond the adjudicatory context, these mechanisms run the gam-
bit from the ultimate threat of military intervention, to the imposition of sanc-
tions, to the use of "soft power" tools to secure compliance. For reasons of
space, this Article constrains its analysis to the adjudicatory settings through
which the law on state responsibility is enforced. Crucially however, the exclu-
sion of non-adjudicative mechanisms from the purview of this Article does not
diminish the generalizability of its major descriptive insight: across all mecha-
nisms of international law enforcement a bifurcated response to State-Enabled
Crimes is the norm. And while this Article's prescriptive proposal is directed to
an adjudicative mechanism, the ICC, its normative argument in favor of mov-
ing from a bifurcated to an integrated response to State-Enabled Crimes applies
to any and all mechanisms of international law enforcement. -
Second, this Article does not address crimes in which other types of or-
ganizations play a role analogous to that played by the state in State-Enabled
Crimes. Such non-state entities exert an ever-increasing influence on the com-
mission of international crime.16 But because they have varying legal personal-
ities under international law, any potential enforcement mechanism for an inte-
grated response to the crimes that these entities enable deserves separate
consideration.
Part I of the Article justifies the introduction of State-Enabled Crimes as
an analytical category to unite a subset of international crimes in which the
state has played an integral role and sets out a general description. I then pro-
vide a brief descriptive account of each side of the existing bifurcated structure
for adjudicating State-Enabled Crimes: the mechanisms for adjudicating inter-
national criminal law on the one hand, and the law of state responsibility on the
other. Part II presents an analysis of the problems with adjudicating State-
Enabled Crimes under the bifurcated structure of the existing system, empha-
sizing the distorted picture it generates of both how these crimes are committed
and where the balance of responsibility for them lies. Part III moves from prob-
lem to solution, presenting the argument for adopting an integrated response to
State-Enabled Crimes, whereby the responsibility of both the individual and the
state would be adjudicated by a single court. I demonstrate how an integrated
response could mitigate unfairness and inaccuracy and achieve the objectives of
peace and reconciliation, deterrence, and retribution at least as well, and in
16. See, e.g., David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Idean Salehyan, Non-State
Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset, 30 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCL 516 (2013); James G. Stewart,
The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes: Transcending the Alien Tort Statute,
47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 121 (2014).
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most cases better, than a bifurcated response. I also address an important coun-
terargument, explaining why an integrated response would not amount to the
imposition of collective guilt on the population of a state found responsible for
a State-Enabled Crime. Finally, I propose a modification to trials at the ICC as
one example of a mechanism through which an integrated response to State-
Enabled Crimes could be brought to life and respond to potential concerns
about the feasibility of the proposal.
I. THE BIFURCATED RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL CRIME
International crimes are committed by individuals, but many of them
would not have been committed absent the integral role played by the state. In
such instances, the state policies or practices that construct what social psy-
chologists call situational factors had a significant influence on the course of
action taken by the individual who committed the crime. Of course, all crime,
whether domestic or international, is committed against the backdrop of some
configuration of situational factors.17 But what distinguishes most international
crimes from most domestic ones is the political and/or organizational entity that
constructs these factors.' 8 And with many international crimes, this entity
comes in the form of the state.
The role of the state permeates the work of courts and tribunals tasked
with holding individuals responsible for international crimes. At the ICC, for
example, the role of the state has been apparent in the Court's descriptions of
how the crimes against hundreds of thousands of Sudanese citizens were com-
mitted in Darfur. When issuing an arrest warrant against the Minister of State
for the Interior, Ahmad Harun, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber focused on Harun's
role in "coordinating the different bodies of the Government involved in the
counter-insurgency, including the Police, the Armed Forces, the National Secu-
rity and Intelligence Service and the Militia/Janjaweed."l 9 And it is not only
crimes committed by state officials where the state's role has been integral. In
its decision to issue an arrest warrant against non-state militia leader Ali
Kushayb, the Court was only able to make sense of his role in relation to the
17. See, e.g., Roger V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and Practi-
cal Scope, 4 CRIME & JUST. 225 (1983).
18. This is a rough generalization. There are certainly domestic crimes, such as those conduct-
ed by members of the Mafia or by other gangs, in which the organizational context is crucial. And it
may be that such crimes would also benefit from the kind of integrated approach advanced here. Unfor-
tunately, fuller consideration of this possibility is beyond the scope of this Article. But the more general
distinction is fair in that unlike most domestic crimes, the main international crimes require an organiza-
tional element as a practical matter and/or as an element of the crime. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court art. 7(1), opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute] (defining crimes against humanity as those committed as part of a "widespread or sys-
tematic attack"). The ICC Elements of the Crimes further clarifies that the "State or organizational poli-
cy" behind the attack must involve "the State or organization actively promot[ing] or encourag[ing] such
an attack." SEC'Y OF THE ASSEMBLY OF STATE PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INT'L CRIMINAL
COURT, OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, FIRST SESSION, at pt. II.B.5 (New York, Sept. 2002).
19. Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb, 1 7
(Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279860.pdf.
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way it served "the strategy of the Government of Sudan." 20
The contributory role of state policies and practices renders crimes such
as these worthy of a description that unifies them, and of a response that distin-
guishes them from other international crimes. With State-Enabled Crimes, I
seek to establish an analytical category that will fulfill this unifying function
and illuminate the deep connection between state authority and individual ac-
tion that is at the heart of so many international crimes. To be clear, I am not
trying to define a new crime. Rather, my intent is to group together a subset of
instances in order to draw attention to the commonalities among them. Only
once the duality of individual and state in the commission of so much interna-
tional criminal activity is highlighted does the bifurcated response of the inter-
national legal system, which addresses individual and state responsibilities in
isolation, move from its current taken-for-granted status to something question-
21
able and, ultimately, unsatisfactory.
After describing State-Enabled Crimes and distinguishing the concept
from other efforts to conceptualize the state's role in international crime, I pre-
sent a short descriptive section about each side of the bifurcated structure that
currently exists for adjudicating international crime. The first of these focuses
on international criminal law and the institutions that expound it, emphasizing
the dominance of this side of the system for adjudicating State-Enabled Crimes.
The second explains the lesser-known law of state responsibility that fills out
the other side of the system.
A. State-Enabled Crimes
I use the term State-Enabled Crimes to describe a category that encom-
passes instances in which state authority, manifest through the policies or prac-
tices of state organs, was integral to the nature and scale of a crime that was
committed. The description is neutral as to the type of individuals involved
since, as the atrocities in Darfur demonstrate, State-Enabled Crimes can be
committed by state officials and non-state actors alike. What matters is the de-
gree to which the policies or practices of the state were integral to the commis-
sion of the crime.
Some examples falling inside the category of State-Enabled Crimes re-
quire state involvement as an element of the crime under their convention-
based definitions. For example, under the U.N. Convention Against Enforced
Disappearance, enforced disappearance entails "the arrest, detention, abduction
or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons
or groups ofpersons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State." 22 But under their international criminal law definitions, many of
20. Id. $ 5.
21. See infra Section II.C.
22. G.A. Res. 61/177, art. 2, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (Dec. 20, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. 17-18, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (Torture is that which is "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
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those same offenses do not technically require state involvement as an element
of the crime, even though they often do require the kinds of policies or organi-
zational attributes that a state is particularly well-equipped to provide.23
These divergent definitions pose no problem, however, in determining
whether or not a particular incident falls within the category of State-Enabled
Crimes, since the categorization does not turn on the legal label that a given in-
cident has been assigned. Rather, the question of whether or not a given inci-
dent constituted a State-Enabled Crime necessitates a factual inquiry into the
circumstances of its commission. One cannot say, for example, that all instanc-
es of genocide constitute State-Enabled Crimes. Some instances of genocide,
such as Janjaweed attacks in Darfur, will fall inside the category of State-
Enabled Crimes because of the integral role played by Sudanese state policy
and practice. Other instances of genocide, such as attacks by Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on the Yazidi population, will fall outside the category
since the policies of a non-state entity lie behind the attacks.24 Likewise, some
instances of torture, such as those currently occurring in Syrian detention sites,
will fall into the category of State-Enabled Crimes. Yet other instances, such as
torture by a single rogue police officer in defiance of state policy and practice,
would not constitute State-Enabled Crimes.
This latter example may strike some as counterintuitive. After all, the
state bears some degree of responsibility for the actions of all those who wear
its uniform, even when its officials are truly "bad apples" acting in contraven-
tion of the state's policies and practices.25 But State-Enabled Crimes is a cate-
gory reserved to those instances in which the policies and practices of the state
were integral, rather than incidental, to the nature and scale of the crime that
was committed. It is only when a substantial source of wrongdoing lies in such
policies and practices, that the international legal system should be troubled
with its status quo approach that fails to adjudicate state responsibility for these
policies and practices alongside its adjudication of the responsibility of individ-
or acquiescence ofa public official or other person acting in an official capacity." (emphasis added)).
23. Under their Rome Statute definitions, the state requirements of many international crimes
have been replaced by terminology that would account for a non-state entity fulfilling the same role. For
example, enforced disappearance is that which is committed "with the authorization, support or acquies-
cence of, a State or a political organization." Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 77 (emphasis added);
cf International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, supra note
22, art. 2.
24. 1 am sympathetic to readers who are frustrated that an entity causing as much harm as ISIS
is not covered by the proposal I advance here. But my purpose in this Article is not to expand the exist-
ing law of state responsibility to encompass entities which, while arguably having some of the character-
istics of a state, are nonetheless not states under existing international law. See Montevideo Convention
on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 6, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. Instead, I seek to
explore what progress can be made within the parameters of existing law through the use of integrated
adjudicative mechanisms. To the extent there is disagreement within international law over what entities
do and do not constitute states, such disagreements remain unresolved by this proposal.
25. This includes legal responsibility under the law of state responsibility. Thus, states could
be held responsible for the acts of the rogue police officer before the ICJ or the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, for example. For other examples, see VelAsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1 174 (July 29, 1988); G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, art. 7, Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility].
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uals.
The easy determinations of what does and does not fall into the category
of State-Enabled Crimes lie at the extremes of a continuum. Whenever the full
force of a state's authority has been deployed in the service of an international
crime, a State-Enabled Crime has been committed. The Holocaust represents
the paradigmatic case. At the other extreme are cases in which, not only was
there no state involvement in the crime, but the state's authority was actively
directed toward preventing the crime. An example would be torture committed
by rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The question that marks the boundary line between what is and is not a
State-Enabled Crime is whether a crime of substantively the same nature and
scale would have occurred if the relevant policy or practice of a state organ or
organs had been different. When the answer is no, then state authority, whether
manifest affirmatively or through deliberate omission, was integral to the
commission of the crime, rendering it a State-Enabled Crime. When the answer
is yes, then state authority was not integral, and thus it was not a State-Enabled
Crime.
There is undoubtedly a grey zone in which reasonable people are likely to
differ in their assessment of a given case, and in many instances the determina-
tion will be impossible to discern absent a full-fledged factual inquiry. If a
handful of prison officers across the country have committed torture it may be
that they are "bad apples" acting in contravention of the policy of the Depart-
ment of Corrections and the practice of other officials within it.26 On the other
hand, if scores of prison officers across the country repeatedly commit torture,
one might suspect the existence of a policy, or at least informal practice by the
department that enables the crimes. But in either case, a factual inquiry into the
existence of a policy or practice would likely be required to determine whether
or not a State-Enabled Crime had occurred. 27
With a working description of State-Enabled Crimes in hand, it is possi-
ble to distinguish the concept from previous efforts to home in on the state's
role in international crime. First, State-Enabled Crime is different from the ef-
fort to establish a legal category of State Crime, which certain members of the
International Law Commission (ILC) argued vehemently in favor of during de-
bates that lasted from 1969 through to the end of the twentieth century.28
Those looking to establish State Crime envisaged it as crime for which the state
would be made the direct subject of criminal liability.29 The case for state
26. Of course, the prison officers could be prosecuted and their crimes brought to a halt, but
this is not the same as saying that a different policy or practice by the Department of Corrections would
have substantially changed the nature and scale of the crimes committed.
27. Those versed in U.S. domestic law will recognize the parallels here with a section 1983
"Monell claim." See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Karen M. Blum,
Making Out the Monell Claim Under Section 1983, TOURo L. REV. 829, 842-48 (2009) (discussing enti-
ty liability on the basis of deliberate omission).
28. See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 1-60 (2002) (recounting the history
of the discussion on State Crime at the ILC).
29. State-Enabled Crimes are also distinguishable from another semantically similar term,
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criminality was eventually abandoned in favor of the law of state responsibil-
ity.30 The concept of State-Enabled Crimes absorbs this development, seeking
not to hold the state criminally liable, but simply to recognize its civil responsi-
bility under existing international law for the policies and practices through
which it enables individuals to commit international crimes.
Second, State-Enabled Crimes are distinguishable from Andr6 Nol-
Ikaemper's analytical concept of "system criminality," which considers the role
of the state but which also incorporates the impact of systems more broadly.31
Thus unlike State-Enabled Crimes, system criminality also accounts for the role
played by entities such as political parties, corporations, and non-governmental
organizations.
System criminality usefully highlights that the influence of situational
factors on the commission of international crime is not limited to scenarios in
which the state play a role. But the narrower focus of State-Enabled Crimes
adds value for two reasons. First, while non-state groups are increasingly
demonstrating their organizational capacity to be involved with crimes on the
kind of scale that used to be reserved for the state (and here again the self-
proclaimed Islamic State comes readily to mind), states nonetheless have a pre-
sumptive legitimacy with respect to the creation and enforcement of law that
other entities lack. Second, when it comes to international adjudication, states
alone are the only entities accorded a full legal personality.32 This justifies ad-
dressing the state's role as a distinct scholarly endeavor since any prescriptive
responses offered must account for the particularity of the state's legal person-
ality.
B. International Criminal Law
It is easy enough to take the dominance of international criminal law for
granted. By 2020, law schools will be filled with students who never knew a
world without the ICC. But the existence of international criminal law as a ro-
bust concept, let alone as a functioning system, can only be traced as far back
as the aftermath of World War II.33 Only in the post-World War II trials at Nu-
"crimes of state," which Jos6 Alvarez used in binary opposition to the term "crimes of hate" in a 1999
article. Jose Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365
(1999). Alvarez used the two terms as a rhetorical device to critique the primacy of the international,
over local, response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, but they do not have any content or life beyond that
article. Id.
30. The long history of the State Crime debate is fully documented elsewhere. See generally
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC'S DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (Joseph Weiler et al. eds., 1988); see also NINA JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 1-27 (2000) (arguing that the concept "took a back seat" to inter-
national criminal law, but has never actually gone away.)
31. See SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9.
32. The distinctiveness of the state's legal personality is, however, contested. See, e.g., JOSe
ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 3 (2003); Julian Arato, Corporations as
Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT'L L. J. 229 (2015).
33. There was, of course, the attempt of the Allies, post-World War I, to have the Kaiser, Wil-
helm 11, held individually responsible in an international criminal court, but this endeavor never came to
fruition. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (1959).
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remberg and Tokyo was the veil of the state pierced for the first time to claim,
in the words of Justice Jackson, who served as the Nuremburg Prosecutor, that
"[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract enti-
ties.",34 Notwithstanding the myriad problems of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tri-
als, 35 they opened the conceptual legal landscape to the potential for individu-
als to be held responsible for international crimes, even when those crimes
were committed under the auspices of the state. 36
Still, it took almost another fifty years for the international legal system to
further develop the mechanisms to hold individuals accountable. 37 The first
step came in 1993 when, in the wake of the atrocities that followed the break-
up of the former Yugoslavia, the U.N. Security Council used its powers under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to establish the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).38 The following year, after the Rwandan
genocide left some 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu dead, the Security Coun-
cil again acted to establish an international justice mechanism, this time in the
form of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).39
The statutes establishing the ICTY and ICTR made the individual their
exclusive concern,40 and ensured that individuals alone would be held respon-
sible, even for crimes that would not have been committed absent the state.41
As American jurist (and future Presiding Judge of the ICTY and ICTR Appeals
Chambers) Theodor Meron concluded in a 1995 speech evaluating the signifi-
cance of the tribunals, "The moral importance of attaching guilt to individuals
has been reaffirmed."4 2 This laser focus on the individual permeated the prac-
tice of the tribunals. In the words of ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, in her
opening statement to the court in the case against the former President of Yu-
goslavia, Slobodan Milosevic: "The accused in this case, as in all cases before
this Tribunal, is charged as an individual: he is prosecuted on the basis of his
34. See Judgment, in I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 171,
223 (1947).
35. See, e.g., F.B. Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future, AM.
J. INT'L L. 770 (1947) (questioning the legality of the Nuremberg trials).
36. See, e.g., P.M. Dupuy, International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and Interna-
tional Responsibility of the State, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1085-86 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); David Scheffer, Nuremberg Trials, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 764, 771 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2005).
37. The reason for the delay had little to do with the law and everything to do with the politics
of the Cold War era. See DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A
WORLD OF POWER POLITICS 2-3 (2014).
38. S.C. Res. 827, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
39. S.C. Res. 955, Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute].
40. See ICTY Statute, supra note 38, art. 6 (limiting jurisdiction to "natural persons"); ICTR
Statute, supra note 39, art. 5 (same).
41. Article 7 of the ICTY Statute and article 6 of the ICTR Statute ensure individual responsi-
bility no matter the individual's relationship to the state, nor the role that orders from state officials
played. See ICTY Statute, supra note 38, art. 7; ICTR Statute, supra note 39, art. 6.
42. THEODOR MERON, Nuremberg and the Rule of Law: A Fifty-Year Verdict, in WAR CRIMES
LAW COMES OF AGE 198, 202 (1999).
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individual criminal responsibility. No state or organisation is on trial here to-
day." 43
As the tribunals went about their business, work continued on drafting the
statute for a permanent international court. The adoption of the Rome Statute
was "heralded by many as a triumph for humanity."" And in June 2004, the
ICC opened its first investigation. 45 As with the ad hoc tribunals, the newly
minted Court was designed to focus exclusively on the responsibility individu-
als.4
With 796 staff and an annual budget of E135 million, the ICC is now the
largest in a constellation of internationalized courts and hybrid tribunals bring-
ing international criminal law to all comers of the globe. 47 Undergirding this
spectacular rise of international criminal law from virtual non-existence less
than a century ago, to its position as the dominant response of the international
legal system to international crimes today, has been a fervently-held belief in
the potential of individualized guilt and punishment to achieve the objectives of
prevention, peace and reconciliation, and retribution. 48 As Mark Drumbl has
summarized, "[F]aith on the part of so many activists, scholars, states, and poli-
cymakers in the potential of international criminal justice has spawned one of
the more extensive waves of institution-building in modern international rela-
tions."4 9
The degree to which international criminal trials actually achieve the
goals on which their development has been justified is a matter of intense de-
bate. The relevant point here, however, is the overwhelming power these nor-
mative arguments have had in justifying the turn to international criminal law
over the past two decades. As a result, any alternative vision for how the inter-
national legal system should respond to State-Enabled Crimes will have to
demonstrate its potential to satisfy these goals at least as well, if not better, than
the current system.
43. Feb. 12, 2002, INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodanmilosevic/trans/en/0202121T.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
44. Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International Criminal Law, 12
FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 249 (2001).
45. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Opens Its First Investigation (June 23, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press
%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/the%20ffice%20of0o20the%20prosecutor%/o2Oof/o2Ot
he%20international%20criminal%20court%20opens%20its%20first%2Oinvestigation.aspx.
46. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 25(1) (restricting the Court's jurisdiction to "natural per-
sons").
47. See INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, PROPOSED PROGRAMME BUDGET FOR 2015 OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ICC-ASP/13/10, at 160 (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/icc
docs/asp docs/ASP13/ICC-ASP-13-11-ENG.pdf.
48. See generally Kathryn Sikkink, From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Account-
ability: A New Regulatory Model for Core Human Rights Violations, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL
REGULATION 121, 137 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (describing the "striking agenda
change from a state accountability model to a criminal justice model").
49. Drumbl, supra note 5, at 547.
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C. Law of State Responsibility
When it comes to adjudicating State-Enabled Crimes, the law of state re-
sponsibility is the poor cousin to international criminal law. While the latter is
salient in the public imagination, with a list of shiny new institutions that have
facilitated its rise to prominence, the law of state responsibility has been devel-
oping with comparatively little fanfare.so The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and regional human rights courts have jurisdiction over the law of state
responsibility for international crimes. But these mechanisms face significant
limitations, both legal and political, when it comes to the adjudication of the
state's role in State-Enabled Crimes.5 ' Thus to the degree international law is
enforced in adjudicatory settings, such settings skew responsibility for State-
Enabled Crimes toward individuals, thereby sidelining the role played by the
state.
The major codification effort with respect to state responsibility under in-
ternational law began in 1956. But progress was slow and the resulting Articles
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Articles on
State Responsibility or Articles) were not adopted by the ILC until 2001. 52
While the Articles have been noted by the U.N. General Assembly, they do not
yet have the status of formal law.53 Nonetheless, even in their present form,
54 5556they are routinely treated by domestic, regional,55 and international courts
as though they had the formal status of law.57
The Articles on State Responsibility are a set of secondary rules establish-
ing the consequences that follow when states breach their primary obligations
under international law. The consequences vary in severity but they are all non-
criminal. Nonetheless, the Articles provide a solid basis for holding a state re-
50. As one metric, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its first judgment on state
responsibility in 1949. Today it operates with less than one-sixth of the staff and just over one-third of
the budget of the ICC. See INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 47; UNITED NATIONS GEN. ASSEMBLY,
PROGRAMME BUDGET FOR THE BIENNIUM 2014-2015, U.N. Doc. A/68/6/Add.1 (Apr. 22, 2014)
http://www.un.org/ga/search/viewdoc.asp?symbol=A/68/6/Add. 1.
51. See infra Section II.B.
52. CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at ix (2002).
53. The question of whether to turn the Articles into a treaty remains a matter of debate. See
James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Continuing Debate on a UN Convention on State Responsibility,
54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 959 (2005).
54. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR
955/00, 1038/01, 26 Oct. 2004, partially translated in U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 1 98, U.N. Doc. A/62/63/Add.l (Mar. 9, 2007); Cass., sez. un., 11
marzo 2004, n. 5044, 87 RDI 539 (2004), translated in 128 I.L.R 658, 668 (2004); A v. Sec'y of State
for Home Dep't (No. 2) [2006] 2 A.C. 221, 262-63 (appeal taken from Eng.).
55. See, e.g., Ilasqu v. Moldova (No. 48787/99), 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179; Juridical Condi-
tion and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser.
A) No. 18, ¶ 70 (Sept. 17, 2003) (separate opinion by Cangado Trindade, J.).
56. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99,
¶ 137 (Feb. 3); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Genocide Judgment) (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶
173 (Feb. 26); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judg-
ment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168,¶ 160 (Dec. 19).
57. For a critical view on this, see David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility:
The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 857 (2002).
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sponsible for its role in a State-Enabled Crime by way of a chapter that ad-
dresses "serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general in-
ternational law."58
Taking the different parts of this in turn, a "serious breach" involves a
"gross and systematic failure" by the state.59 All State-Enabled Crimes would
readily constitute such a breach; the establishment and maintenance of policies
and practices sufficient to enable the commission of international crimes would
necessarily imply a gross and systematic failure by the state to uphold its obli-
gation not to violate the norms prohibiting such crimes. Moving to "peremptory
norms" (used interchangeably with its Latin counterpart, jus cogens), the Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties describes these norms as those "accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted."6o
The consequences flowing from a serious breach aim not only to provide
reparations for victims but also to ensure that the serious breach is not repeated
in the future. Specifically, offending states are obliged to cease the wrongful
act; offer guarantees of non-repetition where appropriate;62 and make repara-
tions,63 which may include restitution, compensation,65 and/or satisfaction,
such as through an expression of regret or formal apology.66 Moreover other
states are obliged to cooperate to "bring [the breach] to an end through lawful
means" 67 and to neither recognize the situation created by the breach as lawful
nor provide aid or assistance in maintaining it.68
Importantly, given that so many State-Enabled Crimes involve the re-
58. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 25, ch. III. Of course, this is in addition to ju-
risdictional provisions in crime-specific conventions that states may have joined.
59. Id. art. 42.
60. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. As
an evolving concept, it is hard to find an exhaustive compilation of the acts that violate peremptory
norms. See, e.g., Jordan Paust, The Reality ofJus Cogens, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 81, 83 (1991).
60. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 177, 248. However the ILC's illustrative list of the "most obvious and best settled" jus cogens
norms includes "[i]ntemational laws that prohibit the performance of any other act criminal under inter-
national law." Id. To take a source closer to home, the U.S. Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law
states that a state is in violation of international law if "as a matter of state policy it encourages, practices
or condones" genocide, slavery, murder or enforced disappearance, torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, or "a consistent
pattern of gross violations of intemationally recognized human rights." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702, at 161. It is important to note that obligations
erga omnes are not, as a theoretical matter, co-extensive with jus cogens norms. See, e.g., Paolo Picone,
The Distinction Between Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND
THE VIENNA CONVENTION 411, 415 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011). The latter may incorporate acts more
expansive than those covered under State-Enabled Crimes, but wherever the exact outer limits are
drawn, the relevant point is that all State-Enabled Crimes would be covered.
61. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 25, art. 30(a).
62. Id. art. 30(b).
63. Id. art. 31.
64. Id. art. 35.
65. Id. art. 36.
66. Id. art. 37(l)-(2).
67. Id. art. 41(1).
68. Id. art. 41(2).
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sponsibility of a state for crimes committed against its own citizens, the law of
state responsibility enables states that have no traditional ties to the crime, like
territory or the nationality of the victims, to pursue action against the responsi-
ble state.69 Finally, the Articles on State Responsibility specify that reparations
for a serious breach are to be made "in the interest of the injured state or of the
beneficiaries of the obligation breached." 70 The inclusion of beneficiaries be-
yond the injured state itself opens the door for reparations to move beyond a
traditional state-to-state system, extending to individuals who have suffered as
a result of acts for which the state is responsible.
Overall, then, the Articles on State Responsibility establish that repara-
tions, including restitution, compensation, and satisfaction for all State-Enabled
Crimes, can be pursued against the state that is responsible, by any state, for the
benefit of any entity or person injured by those crimes. Such a body of law, if
fully implemented, would provide a comprehensive means for addressing the
state's role in State-Enabled Crime. It would provide restitution for the (back-
ward-looking) effects on victims and mitigate the (forward-looking) risks of
recurrence. Yet despite this body of law, the invocation of state responsibility
for State-Enabled Crimes is very limited in adjudicatory settings, and inconsist-
ently applied throughout the international legal system. 1
II. THE MISMATCH BETWEEN COMMISSION AND RESPONSE
The roles of the individual and the state are integrated with respect to the
commission of a State-Enabled Crime, yet the international legal system bifur-
cates these two roles at the point of adjudication. 72 What results is a mismatch
between the commingling of responsibility at the level of commission and the
69. When the obligation breached is "owed to the international community as a whole"-a
term of art that overlaps with breaches constituting State-Enabled Crimes-then any state can pursue
consequences against the offending state. See id. art. 48(1); see also Louis Henkin, Inter-State Responsi-
bility for Compliance with Human Rights Obligations, in MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO CASSESE 383, 394 (Lal Chand Vohrah et al. eds., 2003)
(elaborating that a state party to a human rights treaty may seek compliance by another state party, and
that it can resort to remedies provided in the treaty itself).
70. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 25, art. 48(2)(b).
71. See infra Section II.B. One might speculate that international criminal law stands in place
of the law of state responsibility. Yet the occlusion of the state is by no means a necessary consequence
of international criminal law's dominance in adjudicatory settings. Certainly as a legal matter, interna-
tional law is clear that individual responsibility cannot serve as a substitute for state responsibility. See
Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
Commentaries, art. 58, cmt. 3, U.N. Doe. A/56/10 (2001); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-
17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 142 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). The harms in-
volved, while intertwined, are not identical. No number of individual prosecutions can fully account for
the harm that flows from the misuse of state authority since that harm, if left unaccounted for, adheres to
the structures of the state itself, extending beyond any individual present at the time of the crime. See
Thomas M. Franck, Individual Criminal Liability and Collective Civil Responsibility: Do They Rein-
force or Contradict One Another? 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 567, 569-70 (2007).
72. In a rare article on the duality of individual and state responsibility for international crime,
albeit limited to a consideration of genocide, Philippa Webb observes that even as international instru-
ments recognize this duality, they provide no guidance as to how "overlaps, interplay or contradiction
between the two regimes can be resolved." Philippa Webb, Binocular Vision: State Responsibility and
Individual Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, in THE DIVERSIFICATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 177, 120 (Larissa van den Herik & Carsten Stahn eds., 2012).
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bifurcation of responsibility at the level of adjudication. And although the exist-
ing literature has not recognized the connection, it is this mismatch that under-
lies several of the major problems that scholars of international criminal law are
currently grappling with.
This section surveys the critical literature on challenges the international
adjudication of State-Enabled Crimes faces and finds significantly more schol-
arship on the criminal law side of the system. This is not, however, due to an
absence of challenges on the law of state responsibility side. An analysis of the
mechanisms for adjudicating state responsibility-at the domestic, regional,
and international levels-reveals the particular challenges of adjudicating
State-Enabled Crimes under this body of law.
A. Adjudicating State-Enabled Crimes Under International Criminal
Law
Alongside the rapid rise of international criminal law, a rich and interdis-
ciplinary body of literature has developed to question its application.73 With
respect to State-Enabled Crimes, several of the most serious concerns scholars
have raised can be understood as products of the existing bifurcated structure,
in which individual responsibility must be adjudicated in isolation from any ad-
judication of state responsibility. The constraints of international criminal law
adjudication under this bifurcated structure generate an inaccurate picture of
how State-Enabled Crimes are committed, resulting in an allocation of respon-
sibility and punishment that is unfair to defendants and victims alike. In a typi-
cal scenario, a select few perpetrators are over-punished while a much greater
number are spared any punishment at all. And all the while the role played by
the state is left unaccounted for.
Taking in turn the scholarly concerns that I argue are best understood as
flowing from the bifurcated structure of the existing system, Saira Mohamed
has recently described the first as "the deviance paradox." 74 To understand the
concern, it is useful to start from the perspective of an individual perpetrator.
One might readily imagine that a person who committed genocide in Rwanda
or Nazi Germany had an inherently different psychological profile from the rest
of us. Yet case studies do not bear this out. As Christopher Browning character-
73. A piece by Sanford Levinson is an early forerunner of this literature. He laments the "in-
verse relationship between the number of individuals involved" and "the efficacy of traditional legal
analysis as a mode of comprehending it." Sanford Levinson, Responsibility for Crimes of War, 2 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF., 244, 245 (1973). And, he adds, "of no area is this more true than criminal law." Id.; see
also GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); Drumbl, supra note 5; Osiel, supra note 5.
74. Mohamed, supra note 5, at 1639 (introducing the term "deviance paradox"). Although the
term is new, the basic phenomenon it describes has been identified for some time. See, e.g., H.C.
KELMAN & V.L. HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY
AND RESPONSIBILITY 46 (1989). Scholars who have drawn attention to the deviance paradox cite to what
are now well-known psychological experiments, in particular the "electric shock" obedience experiment
run by Stanley Milgram in the 1960s and the Stanford Prison Experiment run by Philip Zimbardo in
1970s. Both experiments demonstrated, with chilling force, the influence of situational forces on behav-
ior. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974); PHILIP
ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007).
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ized the members of Reserve Battalion 101 who followed orders to kill some
1,500 Jews in their Polish village in 1942, they were "ordinary men."75 It was
exactly this problem that Hannah Arendt encountered in writing her profile of
Nazi SS Colonel Adolf Eichmann, "an average, 'normal' person," and that led
her to reflect on "the banality of evil."76 In a time and place in which all the
usual sources of authority-from family and neighbors, through to the govern-
ment and church-view the killing of a particular group as necessary, murder is
reconfigured from an act of deviance to one of normalcy. 77 And it is just such a
reconfiguration that is integral to most, if not all, State-Enabled Crimes.
To take an example from the so-called Global War on Terror, as much as
it would be comforting to label members of the 372nd Military Police Army
Reserve Company as "bad apples," the reality is that on the night shift at Tier
1A of Abu Ghraib, their actions were not viewed as deviant. And while indi-
vidual personalities played a contributing role, an independent panel review
found that "the abuses were not just the failure of individuals to follow stand-
ards ... [nor were they] the failure of a few leaders to enforce proper disci-
pline. Rather, they flowed from the "structural features and operational pol-
icies" put in place by the United States.79
Conclusions like these should not be overly unexpected in light of the
body of social psychology research on the influence of situational factors on
individual behavior.80 But such cases nonetheless present a profound challenge
to a central premise of criminal law, namely that is punishes deviant behavior.
Hence the paradox, whereby international criminal law instead finds itself de-
ployed to punish ordinary people for behavior that is marked, at the point of its
occurrence, by its un-remarkableness.
The acknowledgement of a deviance paradox triggers an inquiry into the
nature of the situational factors that helped to shape otherwise deviant behavior
into the norm. With respect to State-Enabled Crimes, the answer is found pri-
marily in the policies and practices of the state. As Alison Des Forges observed
with respect to leaders of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, "[iln order to carry
through the genocide, they had to capture the state." 8 But under a bifurcated
structure criminal trials focus on individuals, sidelining the role state policies
and practices played in establishing the conditions for a deviance paradox to
75. CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND THE
FINALSOLUTION INPOLAND3 (1992);see also JEANHATZFELD, MACHETE SEASON (2005).
76. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 26,
287 (1963). But see BETTINA STANGNETH, EICHMANN BEFORE JERUSALEM: THE UNEXAMINED LIFE OF
A MASS MURDERER (Ruth Martin trans., 2014) (arguing that Arendt's portrayal of Eichmann was inac-
curate).
77. See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998).
78. Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Opera-
tions, in THE ABU GHRAIH INVESTIGATIONS 2 (Steven Strausser ed., 2004).
79. ZIMBARDO, supra note 74, at 378; see also S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014) (detailing Senate
findings on CIA detention and interrogation); Final Report ofthe Independent Panel to Review Depart-
ment ofDefense Detention Operations, supra note 78, at 1-106.
80. See, e.g., ROSS & NISBETr, supra note 6.
81. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE To TELL THE STORY 6 (1999).
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arise. The net result risks unfairness to defendants who are often punished for a
degree of deviance that their behavior did not reflect.82
This unfairness is compounded by a second concern that scholars have
raised. At least 100,000 people are thought to have participated in The Holo-
caust.83 Closer to 200,000 are estimated to have participated in the 1994 geno-
cide in Rwanda. When State-Enabled Crimes involve mass participation, no
court-let alone an international one-can adjudicate the crimes of every indi-
vidual who deserves to be judged . What results is selective prosecution. As
Heinz Steinert noted, "[A] key limitation of the 'individualising juridical mode'
of imputing responsibility is . . . that it not only produces a handful of the offi-
cially guilty, but many more 'false innocents."' 86
The problem of necessary selectivity has beleaguered the ICTY in partic-
ular. With crimes perpetrated both by and against different ethnic groups, the
mere indictment of a perpetrator from one group has invariably been seen as
both vindicating alleged perpetrators in other groups and undermining the legit-
imacy of claims of victimhood by others from the same group.87 Different
prosecutors have tackled the problem in different ways over time. But ulti-
mately the problem is inherent in the isolated use of individual criminal respon-
sibility for State-Enabled Crimes involving mass participation.
A final concern raised by scholars that stems from a bifurcated structure
is the possibility that thousands of people all committing the same crimes may
in fact not be best conceptualized as individuals, but rather as a group. In the
words of George Fletcher, "[w]hatever the pretense of liberal international law-
yers, the crimes of concern to the international community are collective
crimes." 89 The ICC and the ad hoc tribunals have been conscious of this prob-
82. Saira Mohamed proposes a way out of the paradox by getting judges to acknowledge that
the behavior was not deviant in the context it was committed, but still condemn the individual on the
grounds that the law asks us to aspire to rightful behavior, even with situational factors acting upon us.
See Mohamed, supra note 5, at 1633. But rather than addressing the deviance paradox squarely, this
approach seems to deny its existence.
83. DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS
AND THE HOLOCAUST 167 (1996) (extrapolating from Goldhagen's figures on the number of camps and
the ratio of guards to prisoners, a conservative estimate of 100,000 is readily obtained).
84. Scott Straus, How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate,
6 J. GENOCIDE RES. 85, 93-95 (2004) (estimating that 175,000-215,000 Rwandans participated in the
genocide).
85. The ICTR for example, after 20 years in operation, has indicted 93 individuals. See Key
Figures of Cases, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNALS,
http://www.unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
86. Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy and Juridical Othering, BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 504, 521 (2005).
87. A 2009 Serbia poll showed that ninety-six percent of the Bosniak population in Serbia
thought Ratko Mladid was responsible for the crimes the ICTY charged him with, compared with only sev-
enteen percent of the Serb population. See ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE/BELGRADE CTR.
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLIC PERCEPTION IN SERBIA OF THE ICTY AND THE NATIONAL COURTS DEALING
WITH WAR CRIMES 25 (2009), http://www.law.indiana.edu/front/special/2010_milosevic/materials/belgrade
centre.pdf
88. For an excellent review of the differing charging policies of the various prosecutors at the
international tribunals, see Frederiek de Vlaming, Selection of Defendants, in INTERNATIONAL
PROSECUTORS 542 (Luc Reydams et al. eds., 2012).
89. George Fletcher, Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111
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lem as well. In response, scholars and practitioners of international criminal
law have developed theories that allow for the possibility of charging individu-
als for crimes committed by groups, such as joint criminal enterprise. 90 These
efforts have sought to extend the reach of the law to yet more individuals, while
leaving the bifurcated structure of the existing system intact.91 But as with ef-
forts to address the problem of selective prosecution, theories of group crimi-
nality have arguably generated as many problems as they have resolved.92
B. Adjudicating State-Enabled Crimes Under State Responsibility
Relative to international criminal law, scholarship on the adjudication of
international crime under the law of state responsibility is fairly scant. 93 This is
not, however, due to a lack of challenges arising under the system of state re-
sponsibility. Indeed, as detailed below, there are significant limitations to the
mechanisms available for adjudicating state responsibility for State-Enabled
Crimes. And these limitations go some way to explaining the underutilization
of this body of law with respect to adjudicating such crimes.
1. Domestic Courts: The State Immunity Problem
The primary bar to state responsibility being pursued in a domestic forum
is the law of state immunity (known domestically as foreign sovereign immuni-
ty). State immunity flows from the recognition under the Westphalian system
that states are equal and independent.94 With each state having, in equal meas-
ure to all other states, the right to conduct its sovereign affairs independently,
YALE L.J. 1499, 1514 (2002); see also SIMPSON, supra note 73, at 67.
90. See generally NEHA JAIN, PERPETRATORS AND ACCESSORIES IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTIVE CRIMES (2014).
91. One scholar who has grappled with the possibility of assigning collective responsibility as
an alternative to individual trials is Mark Drumbl. MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 197-98 (2007). More generally though, scholars have looked instead to using the-
ories of group criminality to reach individuals. In either case, the assumption of bifurcation has been
retained.
92. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of
Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 539, 550 (2005) (arguing that some uses of
joint criminal enterprise have "clearly violated the basic principle that individuals should only be pun-
ished for personal culpability"); see also Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associa-
tions: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Crim-
inal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005) (arguing for the reform of JCE in order to better serve the criminal
law principle of culpability).
93. The exception to this generalization lies in the work generated by the ICJ decisions on
genocide in the Former Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Ademola Abass, Proving State Responsibility for Geno-
cide: The ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia and the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, 31 Fordham
Int'l. L.J., 871 (2008); Andrea Gattini, Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in
the ICJ's Genocide Judgment, 18 Eur. J. Int'l L. 695 (2007); Mark Gibney, Genocide and State Respon-
sibility, 7 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 760 (2007). The one early exception to this generalization is in the work of
Nina Jorgensen, who wrote her doctoral thesis in this area. See Jorgensen, supra note 30.
94. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration of Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the Unit-
ed Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) ("All States enjoy sovereign equality," which includes the "political inde-
pendence of the State . . . .").
2016] 319
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
no state's domestic system can sit in judgment of another.95
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the absolutist version of
this doctrine began to come under pressure as the state's commercial activities
expanded.96 A commerciality exception emerged to protect the interests of pri-
vate actors who did business with states. Legislators in nations across the globe
began to adopt the so-called restrictive immunity doctrine. 97
In the United States, the restrictive immunity doctrine formally entered
into law through the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).98 The
FSIA took restrictive immunity a step beyond the commerciality exception,
however, by also carving out a territorial tort exception such that plaintiffs
could sue a foreign state for money damages arising from even non-commercial
activity if the state caused a tort in the United States. 9
The abandonment of absolute sovereign immunity raised the possibility
of further exceptions beyond the commerciality and territorial tort carve-outs.
Human rights scholars argued that it should be possible to sue a foreign state in
U.S. courts for violations of peremptory norms. Their theory was that the ob-
servance of such norms was a condition of statehood, and that since statehood
was a precondition for state immunity, the violation of a peremptory norm con-
stituted an implied waiver of state immunity.100 But that argument has failed
both domestically and internationally.'o t Thus despite efforts by plaintiffs and
95. See HAZEL Fox & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 25-28 (3d ed. 2013).
The traditional maxim associated with these principles is par in parem non habet imperium (an equal
has no power over an equal). The first case in U.S. law typically associated with this principle is
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. 116, 147 (1812).
96. See Third Session of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of Interna-
tional Law, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp. 1928).
97. Under the doctrine, sovereign immunity is retained for acts of sovereign authority (jure
imperii), but no longer upheld for acts that are private or commercial (jure gestionis). See Fox & WEBB,
supra note 93, at 32-38. The line-drawing between these two categories is much more complex in prac-
tice than the binary description suggests. See James Crawford, International Law and Foreign Sover-
eigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 75 (1983).
98. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2012);
see Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (describing FSIA as essentially
codifying the restrictive immunity approach).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2012); see also Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F Supp. 665,
671-75 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding that a claim for money damages arising from the assassination of two
Chilean nationals in Washington was not barred by sovereign immunity because it fell under the excep-
tion under § 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA relating to a tort committed on U.S. territory).
100. See, e.g., Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Implied Waiver Under the
FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77
CAL. L. REV. 365 (1989).
101. The U.S. Supreme Court jettisoned this suggestion with its 1989 decision in Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Corp., rejecting any peremptory norm exemption on the grounds that Con-
gress had not provided for it in the FSIA. 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989). Even after this decision, plaintiffs
*continued to argue that the violation of peremptory norms deserved a special carve-out, though the
courts repeatedly denied this. See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (1994). Plain-
tiffs also tried to secure responsibility for the violation of peremptory norms by trying to bring violations
inside the commerciality exception. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 363 (1993). In 1996,
Congress removed foreign sovereign immunity for certain torts occurring outside the U.S., provided that
the victim was a U.S. national, member of the armed forces, or employee or contractor of the U.S. gov-
emnment acting within their scope of employment, and that the state being sued had been classified by
the State Department as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A) (2011). In 2012, the ICJ
essentially closed the door to the argument that state immunity should be set aside forjus cogens viola-
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human rights advocates alike, the best summation of the law as it stands is that
save for those instances falling inside a commerciality or territorial tort excep-
tion, state responsibility for State-Enabled Crimes cannot be pursued in domes-
tic courts.
2. Regional Courts: Incomplete Coverage and the Fair Labeling
Problem
At the supra-national level, regional human rights courts have the ability
to hold States responsible for State-Enabled Crimes. Two main limitations,
however, undercut the utility of regional human rights courts. The primary
problem is the limited geographical coverage of these courts. A secondary con-
cern relates to limitations on the way these courts can characterize these crimes.
With respect to geographic limitations, only around one-third of the 193
states belonging to the United Nations are covered by combined jurisdiction of
the European Court of Human Rightsl 02 and the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights. 103 Even incorporating the soon-to-be restructured African Court
on Human and Peoples Rights into the equation only adds twenty-six of the fif-
ty-four states in Africa.1
Thus if any state in Asia or the Middle East, many states in Africa, or
states in a significant segment of the Americas, including the United States,
were responsible for State-Enabled Crimes, the regional human rights courts
would not have jurisdiction over their actions.105 Simply put, the regional hu-
man rights system is wholly inadequate from the perspective of the majority of
the global population.
There is a further limitation related to what criminal law theorists de-
scribe as the "fair labeling" problem. The problem arises when the label at-
tached to a defendant's actions fails to accurately reflect the seriousness of
tions, rejecting an argument by Italy that the jus cogens nature of a norm violated by Germany against
an Italian national during World War II trumped the rules on state immunity. See Jurisdictional Immuni-
ties of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, 193 (Feb. 3).
102. The court has jurisdiction over all forty-seven states of the Council of Europe who have all
ratified the convention that established the Court. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty
005: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/signatures (last visited Apr. 4,
2016).
103. At present, nine of the thirty-four countries belonging to the Organization of American
States have not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, and as a result the Court has no
jurisdiction to issue an adjudicatory opinion on cases lodged against those States. See B-32: American
Convention on Human Rights, INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUM. RTS.,
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
104. The protocol to the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights has been ratified by only
twenty-six of the fifty-four countries in the African Union and is now going to be merged into the newly
proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights. At present the new court has only five of the fif-
teen ratifications needed for it to come into effect. See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights (July 1, 2008), art. 9(1).
105. The United States, along with eleven others in the Organization of American States, has
not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, which means that the Inter-American Court
cannot adjudicate claims against it. See B:32 American Convention on Human Rights, INTER-AM.
COMM'N ON HUM. RTS., http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2016).
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those actions. ' Theorists have highlighted the expressive function of the label
attached to a crimel07 and the need for a victim to feel the label accurately re-
flects what she or he suffered.108
While the fair labeling concern has been raised almost exclusively with
respect to criminal law,'m fair labeling concerns have particular salience with
respect to the law of state responsibility for State-Enabled Crimes. As Christine
Evans explains with respect to the Inter-American Court's docket, most of the
applicants are family members of victims, rather than survivors; moreover,
"[d]ue to the nature of the violations, restitution has often been impossible.",
10
For such victims, fair labeling concerns are important because in the absence of
full restitution, they seek public acknowledgement that accurately reflects what
they and their families suffered."' And with respect to a number of State-
Enabled Crimes, a human rights court is unable to fulfill this fair labeling con-
cern.
To illustrate the problem, consider a 2004 decision by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights that found that on July 18, 1982, Guatemalan military
forces massacred an estimated 268 members of the Plan de Sanchez communi-
ty, most of them belonging to the indigenous Mayan population. In the after-
math of the massacre, government forces destroyed the dwellings in the village
and stole the villagers' animals, food stores, and other items crucial for surviv-
al.112 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights explained to the
Court that the massacre "was carried out within the framework of a genocidal
policy of the Guatemalan state."' 13 While not disputing this, the Court had to
note that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over genocide, so it could
not consider the responsibility of the Guatemalan state for genocide as the vic-
tims had requested.'14 Instead it could only conclude that the state was respon-
sible for violations of a multitude of rights ranging from the right to humane
106. See Andrew J. Ashworth, The Elasticity ofMens Rea, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS 45, 56 (1981) ("[T]he legal designation of an offence should
fairly represent the nature of the offender's criminality.").
107. See, e.g., Victor Tadros, Fair Labelling and Social Solidarity, in PRINCIPLES AND VALUES
IN CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 67, 78 (Lucia Zedner & Julian Roberts eds., 2012).
108. See, e.g., James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 MOD. L.
REV. 217, 235-37 (2008).
109. See James Goudkamp, Defences in Tort and Crime, in UNRAVELING TORT AND CRIME
208, 235 (Matthew Dyson ed., 2014).
110. CHRISTINE EVANS, THE RIGHT TO REPARATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR VICTIMS OF
ARMED CONFLICT 67 (2012).
111. See Graham Virgo, Characterisation, Choice of Law and Human Rights, in TORTURE AS
TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION 325, 335 (Craig Scott ed., 2001).
112. Plan de Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Merits, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105
(April 29, 2004).
113. Id. at ¶ 2; see also GUATEMALAN COMM'N FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION, GUATEMALA:
MEMORY OF SILENCE 41 (1999), https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CEHreport-english.pdf
(concluding that agents of the Guatemalan state conducted acts of genocide against groups of Mayan
people).
114. Plan de SAnchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Merits, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105, ¶
51 (April 29, 2004).
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treatment to the right to equal protection. "5 Taking into account the fair label-
ing perspective, this decision failed to accurately reflect what the state was re-
sponsible for.
3. International Courts: Disincentives and the Fact-Finding
Problem
With the pursuit of state responsibility largely precluded at the domestic
level as a result of state immunity, and insufficient at the regional level, due to
both limited geographical coverage and fair labeling concerns, the final ques-
tion is how state responsibility fares at the international level. Here too, prob-
lems arise.
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and a forum
in which, subject to its jurisdictional requirements, states-and states alone-
can bring claims of state responsibility against each other on the basis of viola-
tions of treaty obligations or of customary international law.116
The vast majority of cases at the ICJ are brought by a state that alleges its
rights, or the rights of its citizens, have been violated by another state. But the
vast majority of State-Enabled Crimes involve the responsibility of the state for
alleged violations against its own citizens. Since no state will bring a claim for
responsibility against itself, the pursuit of state responsibility for State-Enabled
Crimes at the ICJ necessarily depends on states that have no direct relationship
to the alleged crimes bringing a case. And with one (arguable) exception, no
such a case has ever been adjudicated with respect to State-Enabled Crimes. 117
The absence of such cases at the ICJ is not due to any legal obstacle. To
115. Id. at para. 52(3).
116. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 933. As with the coverage problems afflicting the regional mechanisms, the ICJ also has some
limitations arising from the fact that roughly two-thirds of the states that are members of the United Na-
tions have not lodged declarations to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. See Declarations Rec-
ognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT'L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction
/index.php?pl=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Apr. 22, 2016). The Court does, however, have a further
route to jurisdiction over states through the various U.N. treaties that grant to the Court jurisdiction. But
a number of states lodge reservations to this jurisdictional article in the treaties they join. For instance,
fourteen countries have entered reservations to the ICJ's jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide
Convention. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Declarations
and Reservations, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mt
dsgno=IV-&chapter-4&lang-en#31 (last visited Apr. 22, 2016). Overall, the ICJ's docket is dominat-
ed by territorial disputes, rather than human rights violations. See BERRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 335 (5th ed. 2007).
117. See Questions Relating to the Obligation To Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Senegal),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 422 (July 20). In that case, Belgium bought a claim of state responsibility
against Senegal on the basis of a number of Chadians who had allegedly been tortured under the regime
of former Chadian President Habr6, who was exiled in Senegal. Some of those Chadians were Belgian
citizens, but the Court held that this connection was not necessary for Belgium to have standing. Id. 1
69. There has been one other case bought by a third-party state, wherein Portugal pursued state respon-
sibility against Australia for the alleged violation of the rights of the Timorese to self-determination.
However the Court declined to adjudicate because a decision would necessarily require the Court to rule
on the legality of Indonesia's conduct and Indonesia had refused to consent to the Court's jurisdiction.
See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, IM 19-23 (June 30).
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the extent that the Articles on State Responsibility reflect international law,lls
they are clear that any state can pursue the responsibility of another state when
"the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole."119
And as noted above, that obligation covers all State-Enabled Crimes.1 20 Even
setting aside the Articles on State Responsibility, the ICJ has itself made clear
that with respect to obligations owed to the international community as a
whole, any state can bring a claim of state responsibility to the court.121 Thus
the primary barrier to the adjudication of state responsibility for most State-
Enabled Crimes is not a legal one, but a political one.122 With the exception of
the state whose citizens are directly injured, a state pursuing responsibility for
State-Enabled Crimes through this forum will face certain and significant dip-
lomatic costs in terms of its relationship with the defendant state (and that
state's allies), without any accompanying benefit to its own citizens.1 23
Of course, with respect to the much narrower pool of cases in which the
victims of a State-Enabled Crime belong to a different state than the one re-
sponsible for the violations, these diplomatic disincentives largely disappear. If
State A's citizens are harmed due to actions that State B is responsible for, then
there may well be political benefits to State A pursuing a claim against State B
at the ICJ. However, the limited experience of such bilateral cases brings a sec-
ondary problem into view; specifically, the ICJ's impaired fact-finding capaci-
ty.
In Bosnia v. Serbia, the ICJ's first case of a state responsibility claim for
118. See supra Section I.C.
119. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 25, art. 48(1)(b). This phraseology is intended,
according to the commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility, to take up the essence of what the
ICJ first termed obligations erga omnes, originally advanced by the ICJ in a now famous paragraph of
dictum in the Barcelona Traction case. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second
Phase, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).
120. See supra Section I.C.
121. The Court's most recent word on this issue came in its 2012 judgment in Questions Relat-
ing to the Obligation To Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 422, $
69 (July 20), although because both states were parties to the U.N. Convention on Torture the Court did
not need to assess what Belgium's standing would have been had it had to rely solely on customary in-
ternational law. See generally Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Judicial Insights into Fundamental Values and
Interests of the International Community, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE
AFTER FIFTY YEARS 327 (A.S. Muller, D. Raid & J.M. Thurinszky eds., 1997) (on the relationship be-
tween standing and erga omnes obligations at the ICJ).
122. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 324 (2001) (describing the
failed effort to get any state to pursue a claim against Cambodia at the ICJ for the atrocities committed
under the Khmer Rouge).
123. The same diplomatic disincentives impact the pursuit of state responsibility at the regional
level also, with the vast majority of cases against states being brought by individual applicants. In the
rare instances in which a state has pursued a claim against another state under the regional human rights
conventions, there has generally been an ethnic or national tie between the complaining state and the
alleged victims. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). And there is only
one case where states without such a connection have brought a case against another state. See Denmark,
Norway, Sweden & Netherlands v. Greece (The Greek Case), App. Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 &
3344/67, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 5 (Eur. Comm'n of H.R.); see also James Becket, The Greek
Case Before the European Human Rights Commission, I HUM. RTS. 91, 95 (1970) (describing the reason
the Scandinavians brought the case as "a reason which might well be without precedent in international
affairs ... a belief it was their moral duty to act"); Henkin, supra note 69, at 395.
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genocide, lodged some fifty years after the Genocide Convention came into
force, the Court relied almost exclusively on the fact-finding done by the ICTY.
This is problematic because it meant relying on a factual record developed by a
tribunal tasked solely with adjudicating individual criminal responsibility; the
parties brought evidence before the ICTY with the purpose of securing the guilt
or innocence of a given individual, not with providing the tribunal with evi-
dence needed to determine state responsibility.
Idiosyncratic factors, such as the untimely death of a defendant, the ina-
bility to secure a defendant's arrest, or simply a particular prosecutorial strate-
gy, influenced what evidence did and did not make it to the tribunal. Such fac-
tors should not have been determinative of what evidence the ICJ assessed in
fulfilling its task of assessing state responsibility. Indeed, after scrutinizing the
Court's 171-page judgment, Justice Goldstone and I concluded that "the
Court's fact-finding approach in this test case raises doubts as to whether, in
practice, a state will ever be held responsible for genocide outside the parame-
ters of the prior convictions of individual perpetrators."'1 24 And the Bosnia v.
Serbia case was merely the latest instantiation of the more general meekness of
the Court with respect to fact-finding.125 Overall then, the international level is
no more promising for the adjudication of state responsibility for State-Enabled
Crimes than either the domestic or regional options.
C. Inherent Flaws of a Bifurcated Response
To recap, both the system of individual criminal responsibility and the
system of state responsibility struggle with adjudicating State-Enabled Crimes.
With respect to individual criminal responsibility, there is a rich body of litera-
ture engaged with identifying these challenges and proposing ways through
them. Still, the scholarship in this area tends to take the bifurcated structure of
the existing system as given and thus fails to draw the connection between
some of the challenges it has identified and the siloed system in which interna-
tional adjudication takes place.
By contrast, the scholarship on the flipside of this coin-the challenges of
adjudicating state responsibility for State-Enabled Crimes-is noticeably
sparse.126 This is not because the system of state responsibility does not face its
own challenges. Indeed, an analysis of its operation at the domestic, regional,
and international level reveals significant limitations in the implementation of
what might otherwise be a useful body of law for holding states accountable for
their role in State-Enabled Crimes.
124. Richard Goldstone & Rebecca Hamilton, Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessons from the Encounter of
the International Court of Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 95, 103 (2008).
125. See, e.g., SHABTAI ROSENNE, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 235-37
(2007) (noting that not once in its history has the Court taken up the option open to it under Article 30 of
its Statute to make its own investigation into the facts); see also Pulp Mills on the Uruguay River (Arg.
v. Ur.), 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 18 (Apr. 20) (joint dissenting opinion by Al-Khasawneh & Simma, JJ.); Mar-
ko Milanovic, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 669, 677 (2007).
126. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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The disparity in attention to these challenges, relative to those faced with-
in the system of individual criminal responsibility, is not by chance; it is a di-
rect reflection of the disparities in the way the international legal system adju-
dicates State-Enabled Crimes. The adjudication of State-Enabled Crimes is not
simply bifurcated; it is bifurcated in a deeply skewed manner. And whatever
the particular balance of reasons for the current state of affairs, one thing is cer-
tain: absent an equally strong system of state responsibility, international crim-
inal law functions to obscure the role of the state in State-Enabled Crimes. It
does this to the degree it creates a historical record that focuses on the role of
individual action without any comparable scrutiny of the state policies and
practices undergirding that action, and to the degree it expresses the condemna-
tion of the international community against individuals-and the individuals
alone. 127
At this point it becomes tempting to suggest that the way forward is to
beef up the existing mechanisms of state responsibility, bringing them on par
with those of individual responsibility. This would be a step in the right direc-
tion to the extent that it would increase the frequency with which the role of
states in State-Enabled Crimes would be adjudicated. But it would leave intact
a fundamentally flawed structure for responding to State-Enabled Crimes-one
in which individual responsibility is adjudicated by one set of courts and state
responsibility is adjudicated by another, generating a fragmented picture of
how these crimes are committed and risking unfair outcomes to defendants and
ultimately to victims. 128
This bifurcated approach makes little sense. Although not previously
framed in these terms, it is the attempt to isolate the individual's role from the
state-constructed situational factors enabling his129 behavior that underpins the
problems with international criminal law described above. As a result, such
problems would persist even if the existing mechanisms for holding states re-
sponsible were of uniformly equivalent strength to those holding individuals
responsible.
In addition, State-Enabled Crimes often involve the most egregious viola-
tions imaginable, and by the time the case reaches a court there may be little
127. Making this point in relation to the ICTY, Jelena Subotic observes, "[T]here is, of course,
a reason that the Serbian government failed to address past violence or claim any responsibility for it.
The nationalist ideological matrix that brought the policies of the 1990s has remained unchanged in Ser-
bia." Jelena Subotic, Expanding the Scope of Post-Conflict Justice: Individual, State and Societal Re-
sponsibility for Mass Atrocity, 48 J. PEACE RES. 157, 164 (2011). And as Gabriella Blum explains in an
article on State Crime, "The project of international criminal law has channeled all explicit punitive urg-
es to individuals, keeping the state protected from punishment." Gabriella Blum, The Crime and Pun-
ishment ofStates, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 57, 121 (2013).
128. The imbalance between individual and state responsibility in adjudicative settings may not
hold true when taking into account the full panoply of mechanisms for international law enforcement.
But what does remain true, no matter which mechanisms are considered, is that the response to State-
Enabled Crimes takes place through a bifurcated structure in which assignments of individual and state
responsibility are made in isolation.
129. I use the male pronoun to describe individual defendants in this Article on the grounds that
most defendants that are adjudicated for their alleged role in State-Enabled Crimes are men. This does
not, of course, mean that women are not also held responsible for their roles in such crimes. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment and Sentence (June 24, 2011).
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doubt about whether the violations actually happened.130 Thus, the pressure on
a court to impose heavy legal consequences on those it has jurisdiction over is
immense. 131 As a consequence, one can readily imagine that even under a per-
fectly balanced structure, a court tasked with determining individual criminal
responsibility would overemphasize the role of individual action relative to the
contributory factors of state involvement, and that a court tasked with assessing
state responsibility would overemphasize the state's role. By contrast, a court
that is able to consider both sides of the responsibility coin concurrently would
be better positioned to reach a more accurate understanding of what took place,
assess relative responsibility in a way that is fair to both individual and state
and, as a result, better serve the interests of victims in understanding the truth
about what happened.
Finally, a bifurcated system, no matter how evenly configured, presents
anyone with information about a State-Enabled Crime the possibility of playing
one side of the system off against the other. To take a concrete example, there
is strong evidence to suggest that a deal the Serbian government made with the
ICTY to grant the tribunal secret and exclusive access to a treasure trove of
state documents in its pursuit of its case against former President Slobodan Mi-
logevi6c, was done specifically to ensure that the ICJ would not be able to ac-
cess those same documents in its case on Serbia's state responsibility.1 32 Only
an integrated response can prevent this kind of horse-trading.
III. AN INTEGRATED RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL CRIME
The analytical category of State-Enabled Crimes highlights the existence
of a significant subset of international crimes that entail the dual responsibility
of individual and state. At the end of the previous Section I noted that the con-
cerns that arise upon recognizing the interconnected role of individual and state
in so many international crimes cannot be resolved simply by ensuring that ac-
countability for the responsibility of individual and state are appropriately bal-
anced within the bifurcated structure of the existing system. In this Section I
advance the arguments in favor of moving to an integrated response, whereby
individual and state responsibility would be adjudicated concurrently by a sin-
gle court.
First, I explain how such a move would mitigate the inaccuracy and un-
fairness of the present system. I also describe and categorize the justifications
130. This is not to say there are not complicated legal issues to resolve, or that the case does not
still have to be proved, but simply that the violations are likely to have been subject to years of media
and human rights reporting prior to their legal adjudication.
13 1. See, e.g., Shahram Dana, Revisiting the Blagkid Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sen-
tencing Jurisprudence ofthe ICTY, 4 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 321 (2004).
132. See Marlise Simons, Serbia's Darkest Pages Hidden from Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/world/europe/08iht-serbia.4.519151 I.html. In the words of
the Deputy ICTY prosecutor at the time, "There was no conceivable reason for making a deal with Yu-
goslavia. It served only one purpose: To keep Belgrade's responsibility from public scrutiny and, signif-
icantly, from the International Court of Justice." Geoffrey Nice, Hidden From Public View; Campaign
Finance Reform: The Tragedy of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/16/opinion/1 6iht-edlet.html.
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advanced for the international adjudication of State-Enabled Crimes and argue
that no matter one's theory of international justice, an integrated response can
achieve the goals of adjudication at least as well, and in most cases much bet-
ter, than a bifurcated response. Second, I describe one way that an integrated
response could be brought to life, explaining how the adjudication of state re-
sponsibility in the reparations phase of an ICC trial for State-Enabled Crimes
would benefit individual defendants, victims, and states alike.
A. Benefits of an Integrated Response
The international legal system could respond to State-Enabled Crimes in
a way that more closely reflects the realities of their commission. State and in-
dividual responsibility are integrated when these crimes are committed, and if
this integration were recognized and reflected in the way the international judi-
cial system responded to these crimes, a more accurate picture and fairer set of
consequences would result. Instead, the current system labors to parse state and
individual responsibility out under bifurcated adjudicative settings.
Conceptual integration is not only possible in both legal and logistical
terms but, as I argue in this section, an integrated response would help address
some of the concerns that scholars have raised with respect to international
criminal law and, crucially, would enhance the ability of the international legal
system to deliver on the goals of prevention, peace and reconciliation, and ret-
ribution.
1. Mitigating Inaccuracy and Unfairness in International
Criminal Law
International criminal law is currently the dominant approach to adjudi-
cating State-Enabled Crimes. But as the scholarship in this area highlights,
there are points of immense tension between the structure and function of an
international criminal trial and the nature of many of the crimes that these trials
adjudicate.
As explained above, individual trials often run into a deviance paradox:
Judges are obliged to condemn individuals for behavior that may not in fact
have been deviant under the circumstances in which it was committed.1 33 This
is unfair to defendants to the degree that it punishes them beyond what their in-
dividual culpability actually merits, and it fails to accurately reflect the role the
state played in crafting circumstances conducive to the perpetration of the
crime. Integrating state responsibility into individual criminal proceedings for
State-Enabled Crimes offers the possibility of resolving the paradox by illumi-
nating the state's role and, as a result, mitigating potentially unjust outcomes
133. See supra Section II.A. Perhaps the most striking example of this occurred in the Erde-
movic case at the ICTY. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. ICTY IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judg-
ment, 123 (Int'l Criminal Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996).
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for individual defendants.
When, through the policies or practices of its organs, a state constructs an
environment that normalizes the individual's deviant behavior, a trial that re-
veals the details of that environment would provide the missing context needed
to assess the defendant's true culpability. Moreover, a trial that could lead to
the state being held accountable for its role would ensure that the context evi-
dence introduced would not serve simply to provide some degree of exculpa-
tion to the defendant, but could also be used to heighten the responsibility of
the state. The result would be an overall picture of accountability that reflects
relative wrongdoing better than under a bifurcated structure in which these two
contributing aspects, of situational factors and individual action, cannot be con-
currently weighted.
Another concern raised about individual trials is that they face a selective
prosecution problem in cases where there are more defendants than a court can
ever hope to try. It is hard for prosecutors to navigate their way through this
without encountering charges of bias, real or perceived. An integrated response
cannot address the problem directly; it does nothing to increase the number of
individual defendants prosecuted, so selective prosecution remains a reality.
But it may help mitigate the perceptions of bias that often flow from these se-
lective charging decisions. Although no other individual is singled out for ac-
countability when the state is held responsible, the determination of legal con-
sequences against the state does spread the responsibility-although, crucially,
not the guilt-among everyone in the state.1 34 Having a single court determine
state responsibility and individual culpability in tandem situates the defendant's
wrongdoing alongside the wrongdoing of others, reducing the implication that
he is uniquely responsible.
2. Strengthening Prevention
Proponents of the international adjudication of State-Enabled Crimes ar-
gue that trials contribute to the goal of prevention at two levels. At a macro lev-
el the idea is that through the process of norm expression, the trials stigmatize
the acts in question, making them more unpalatable in the future.' 35 With glob-
al backing and media interest, international trials are well-suited to play this
expressive role.136 The question, however, is what content they express.137
134. See infra Section IlI.A.3.
135. See, e.g., Mirjan Damatka, What Is the Point ofInternational Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 329, 345 (2008); Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing To Prosecute: Expressive Selection
at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 270 (2012) (describing expressivism as
"the best justification for the ICC's work"); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality,
and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569,
576 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of In-
ternational Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International
Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39 (2007).
136. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 135, at 316 (arguing that the ICC can serve an expressive
function even through "a small number of illustrative prosecutions").
137. See id. at 270 ("The expressive prescription raises questions about what global norms the
ICC should seek to express.").
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Those who defend criminal law by reference to expressivism argue that pun-
ishments draw a line in the sand, marking out the types of behavior that the
community condemns.138 Payam Akhavan, for instance, argues that holding
individuals accountable contributes to "the transformation of a culture of impu-
nity that has hitherto implied the political acceptability of massive human rights
abuses."' 39 The hope then is that this signaling function will help prevent the
recurrence of such crimes in the future.
But what if the norm expressed is in fact something else? What if, taking
both the deviance paradox and the problem of selective prosecution into ac-
count, the norm expressed is that the international community will punish a se-
lect handful of individuals who may, in some cases at least, have behaved much
like the others around them who are not on trial? Of course, this is a particular-
ly uncharitable rendering. In their best form, individual criminal trials could
narrate the potential for people, even in overwhelming situations, to choose to
behave in a manner that is consistent with the standards the international com-
munity seeks to uphold.'4 0 But at present, such a conception remains aspira-
tional, and even if it were achieved, it would pale relative to the power of a
message that an integrated response could send: State-Enabled Crimes are un-
acceptable to the international community, and neither individuals nor states
will be shielded from responsibility for their commission.
Accounting for the state's role is a crucial element of any sensible preven-
tion strategy for State-Enabled Crimes. If the state policies and practices that
enabled the crimes to be committed in the first place are not documented and
challenged, then there is little reason to believe the crimes will stop. While in-
dividuals who participated, or even those who oversaw the crimes may end up
behind bars, others will likely take their place, provided the situational factors
remain the same. In other words, individual criminal responsibility alone is a
half-hearted and somewhat circuitous effort to prevent the recurrence of State-
Enabled Crimes.141
By contrast, the remedies that a court can order following a finding of
state responsibility provide potential mechanisms to tackle the situational fac-
tors behind State-Enabled Crimes more directly. Take, for example, an order of
reparations. If citizens, particularly of a democratic state, have to contribute to
reparations through their taxation system, it is likely that a least at segment of
138. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970).
139. Akhavan, supra note I1, at 8.
140. See Mohamed, supra note 5, at 1631.
141. Even bringing non-adjudicative enforcement mechanisms against the state into view, such
as those sometimes adopted by the U.N. Security Council, the overall picture is of a second-best ap-
proach. Non-adjudicatory mechanisms rarely illuminate in any detail the contribution that state policies
or practices made to the commission of the crimes. Such details, which a court is well-equipped to doc-
ument, can provide civil society advocates, including those inside the country where the State-Enabled
Crimes have occurred, with valuable information for identifying and protesting such policies and prac-
tices in the future. Moreover, enforcement action against a state by the U.N. Security Council is, fairly
or not, more likely to be seen as the product of power politics relative to action taken by a court follow-
ing proceedings in which the state itself has had the opportunity to participate. Such perceptions are like-
ly to matter when it comes to a state's willingness to take measures to prevent further crimes.
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them will pressure their government to ensure that the policies and practices
that enabled the crimes are dismantled-if only out of the self-interest involved
in not wanting to pay further reparations in the future. Indeed, a court could tai-
lor its reparation orders to this specific end, requiring reparation payments to be
continued only if and so long as the policies and practices that enabled the
crime remain in place.
Even absent an order of reparations, a simple call by an international
court for the state to issue an apology is likely to catalyze a conversation do-
mestically about the policies and practices that led to the request. And these
domestic pressures could, and likely would, be supported by human rights ad-
vocates outside the country, ensuring both internal and external pressure for re-
form.1 42
At the micro level, prevention is thought to operate through an individual-
ized conception of deterrence. Unfortunately, the empirical case for interna-
tional trials deterring would-be perpetrators is limited, partly because it is hard
to prove a counterfactual. Moreover, deterrence can take time, and the rapid
expansion of international criminal trials notwithstanding, they are still a rela-
tively new phenomenon.' 43 Nonetheless, it is far from clear that the theory of
deterrence, developed in a domestic setting, is even applicable to international
law, especially once the particular characteristics of State-Enabled Crimes are
factored in. Two problems arise. First, domestic deterrence theories rely on a
strong connection between the commission of a crime and the likelihood of
punishment.'" Yet very few perpetrators of State-Enabled Crimes are ever ac-
tually prosecuted. Proponents of international criminal law point to the histori-
cal baseline of impunity to argue that any advance on this baseline must im-
prove deterrence.1 45 But the move from there being no chance of punishment
to there being very little chance of punishment still leaves us at a significant
distance from the high likelihood of punishment thought to be needed to
achieve deterrence. Even with the ICC in operation, those actually prosecuted
for international crimes constitute just a fraction of those involved in their
commission.
This is not to say that criminalizing the individual's action is unimportant;
it may signal to others that, outside of their immediate setting, such actions are
still deviant and this may deter some such actions. But again it suggests that the
142. See generally MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKK[NK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS
(1998).
143. David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 474 (1999) ("[T]he connection between international prosecutions and the
actual deterrence of future atrocities is at best a plausible but largely untested assumption."). But see
Hyeran Jo & Beth Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity? I (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (concluding on the basis of extensive empirical research that the ICC
"can deter some governments and those rebel groups that seek legitimacy").
144. See, e.g., Charles R. Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 SOC. PROBS. 409, 409-23
(1969).
145. Gerard E. O'Connor, The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why the United States
Should Support the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 927, 974
(1999) ( "[I]t is clear that numerous massacres occurred this century without an ICC in place. Therefore,
a permanent ICC would likely have a deterrent effect . . . .").
2016] 331
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 41: 301
pursuit of the individual addresses only half the story. A bifurcated response
could, of course, address the other half, pursuing state responsibility separately.
But an integrated approach is better yet; by connecting state responsibility with
individual action, the situational factors that enabled the crime's commission
can be brought into plain sight. For deterrence at either the micro or macro lev-
el to stand the best chance, it makes sense to pursue both individual and state
responsibility in an integrated fashion since both are integral to the commission
of State-Enabled Crimes.
3. Fostering Peace and Reconciliation
Proponents of international adjudication believe that international trials
can help achieve peace and reconciliation and they advance three non-exclusive
mechanisms through which this occurs. First, trials can channel instincts of re-
venge into a legal process, thereby reducing the likelihood of retaliatory vio-
lence. While the fairly minimal level of retaliatory violence currently present in
the two State-Enabled Crime situations where international adjudication has
been most thoroughly tested (Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) is potentially
attributable to a range of factors, it at least does not provide substantial discon-
firming evidence for the theory. To the degree trials serve this retaliation-
limiting function, however, there is no reason to think that this function works
any better for a judicial process that focuses solely on individual responsibility
as compared to what it would do with a process that considered both individual
and state responsibility.
Second, proponents argue that trials generate an unassailable historical
record,146 and that without such a record "the embers of yesterday's conflict
can become the fire of tomorrow's renewed conflict." 47 The degree to which
trials create such a record is contested. Some argue that because the purpose of
a criminal trial is to establish the guilt or innocence of the individual defendant,
asking the criminal process to also carry the burden of writing history misun-
derstands, and potentially distorts, its purpose.148 But even accepting that a ju-
dicial process can build a historical record, only an integrated response, illumi-
nating both individual and state responsibility, can hope to represent the truth
about State-Enabled Crimes.
146. See, e.g., BASS, supra note 11, at 302-04; Robert I. Rotberg, Deterring Mass Atrocity
Crimes: The Cause of Our Era, in MASS ATROCITY CRSMES: PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES 1, 9
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2010) ("The establishment of the ICC can bring fabricated denials of the very
existence of war crimes to a halt.").
147. BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 23. A related argument is that knowledge of the truth of what
happened helps survivors, victims' families, and affected communities move forward. See, e.g., Ban Ki-
Moon, UN International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and
for the Dignity of Victims, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/events/righttotruthday/2015/sgmessage
.shtml (Mar. 24, 2015). But see Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human
Rights Violators Console Their Victims?, 46 HARV. INT'L L. REv. 295 (2005) (providing a typology of
psychological effects of the trial process on victims, not all of which are positive).
148. See Saira Mohamed, A Neglected Option: The Contributions of State Responsibility for
Genocide to Transitional Justice, 80 COLO. L. REv. 327, 360 n. 144 (2009) (citing Danner & Martinez,
supra note 92, at 95).
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Finally, proponents believe that in the aftermath of inter-ethnic violence
criminal trials can individualize guilt, thereby mitigating narratives of group
criminality that could spur cycles of vengeance. As former Nuremberg prosecu-
tor Hartley Shawcross argued in defense of the ICTY, "There can be no recon-
ciliation unless individual guilt for the appalling crimes of the last few years
replaces the pernicious theory of collective guilt on which so much racial ha-
tred hangs." 49 Yet even assuming trials do make some headway in undermin-
ing group attribution, there is every reason to imagine that an integrated re-
sponse would strengthen this function.
Imagine if a defendant from an ethnic group generally associated with the
perpetration of violence is on trial: a Hutu defendant at the ICTR, for example.
If the responsibility of the state is not accounted for in the trial, those watching
may impute the defendant's motivations to ethnic group characteristics when,
in reality, the contribution made by the state is a better explanatory variable for
the defendant's behavior. And while under a perfectly balanced bifurcated
structure, a trial on state responsibility could determine that the state played an
important role, an integrated response is the best option for drawing out the in-
fluence of the state on the individual's behavior, thereby reducing the space
available for ethnic group characteristics to be blamed.
4. Advancing Retributive Goals
Finally, retribution is the least commonly advanced of the justifications
for the international adjudication of State-Enabled Crimes. The reason for its
relative unpopularity is not hard to ascertain: it stretches credulity to imagine
that the most common punishment that international criminal law offers-life
imprisonment in a European jail cell-constitutes a "just desert" for those re-
sponsible for the worst crimes imagined by humankind.150 The concern raised
by Hannah Arendt in the aftermath of the Eichmann trial still rings true for
many State-Enabled Crimes: "[N]o punishment is severe enough."is5
Of course, the kind of accountability that flows from state responsibility
is not punitive, so it does not speak directly to retribution. Even so, an integrat-
ed response marks an advance over the existing system on two dimensions.
First, in light of the fair labeling issue raised earlier, an integrated response re-
tains a stronger connection between state responsibility and criminal liability
than any response under a bifurcated structure can.152 Second, retribution is not
just about ensuring that all sources of responsibility are accounted for; it is also
about ensuring that the disbursement of blame between the different sources
149. Hartley Shawcross, Let the Tribunal Do Its Job, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at A17.
150. See Luxury Prison for Bosnia's Iron Lady, TELEGRAPH CALCUTTA, June 7, 2013,
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030607/asp/foreign/story2044806.asp; Enforcement of Sentences,
UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNALS, http://www.unmict.org/en/about/enforcement
-of-sentences (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).
151. HANNAH ARENDT& KARL JASPERS, CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969, at 54 (Lotte Kohler&
Hans Saner eds., Robert Kimber & Rita Kimberm trans., 1992).
152. See supra Section 11.B.2.
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accurately reflects the responsibility of each-the "just" in just desert. And
flowing from the enhanced accuracy already described, an integrated response
presents the greatest likelihood for apportioning blame fairly on the individual
subject to punitive measures.
B. Concerns with an Integrated Response
The benefits offered by an integrated response seem significant. Yet there
is a troubling counter-argument. Would an integrated response be a retrograde
move? Would it place the international legal system back to a pre-World War II
era with the associated b&te noire of collective guilt?
In order to answer these questions in the negative, it is first important to
emphasize that the integrated response proposed here does nothing more than
marry the existing law on state responsibility with international criminal law.
To the extent there are concerns about the collective consequences of an inte-
grated response, they already exist under the current law on state responsibility.
All that the integrated proposal advanced here does is provide a unifying mech-
anism through which to enforce these two existing bodies of law.
In addition, it may be worth acknowledging that consequences for the
state's role in international crime have not been totally abandoned so much as
selectively displaced into a political process. While a fuller consideration of
this phenomenon is beyond the scope of the present Article, it suffices to say
that powerful states regularly impose measures, from economic sanctions to
military incursions, which are punitive in all but name. 153 Such enforcement
mechanisms, conducted under the rhetorical rubric of prevention, are largely
removed from the constraints of formal adjudication and typically fail to meet
basic due process standards.1 54 They increase the ability of the strongest states
in the international system to selectively enforce measures against those who
are disfavored, while leaving themselves and their allies free from sanction
whenever they play a role in State-Enabled Crimes. As a result, citizens of the
weakest states in the international order regularly absorb the costs of their
state's role in State-Enabled Crimes that citizens of powerful states do not. Rel-
ative to the status quo, bringing the remedies that flow from the assignment of
state responsibility within a legal process may in fact be a progressive move.
State responsibility, of course, creates collective responsibility, but this
should not be conflated with collective guilt. While guilt flows from culpabil-
ity, responsibility flows from citizenship. And citizenship, as Michael Walzer
explains, is "common destiny," connecting the continuing entity of the state to
citizens of the past, present, and future.' 55
153. See generally Blum, supra note 127.
154. Id. at 98-103; see also Jeremy M. Farrall, Rule ofAccountability or Rule ofLaw? Regulat-
ing the UN Security Council's Accountability Deficits, 19 J. CONFLICT SECURITY L. 389 (2014). Of rele-
vance to this Article is that such measures also do little to illuminate the state policies and practices un-
derlying State-Enabled Crimes the way that a formal adjudication of state responsibility is able to.
155. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 297 (1977).
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The idea that citizens would share the obligations of state responsibility is
fairly intuitive under a democratic system. To the degree that citizens elect their
representatives-and have the ability to have them removed from office-it
seems reasonable to hold those citizens responsible for the actions of their rep-
resentatives. And just as citizens receive benefits that flow from merely belong-
ing to a state, such as access to courts and voting systems, so too should they
bear the costs.
Under a totalitarian regime, the argument is less obvious, but it can be
found by framing the acceptance of responsibility, and associated burden of
costs, for State-Enabled Crimes as a positive act that should be attributed to the
entirety of a state's people. 156 When a state, totalitarian or otherwise, accepts
responsibility for a State-Enabled Crime, it signals the end of denial and the
promise of a future without such crimes. To the extent this comes with costs,
they may be a fair price to pay for citizenship in a country where state authority
maintains an affirmative opposition to State-Enabled Crimes. And this is par-
ticularly so considering that many State-Enabled Crimes are committed against
the citizens of the state involved.
Finally, any lingering concerns about collective guilt are mitigated by an
integrated response because it adjudicates individual guilt alongside state re-
sponsibility. Thus an integrated response, in contrast to a bifurcated one, makes
explicit the point that criminal guilt lies with particular individuals on trial, not
with every citizen, even if the latter share the costs of state responsibility.
C. Integration in Practice: State Responsibility at the ICC
Having assessed what an integrated response could offer over the existing
bifurcated approach, the final question is what such a response might look like.
In this Section, I present one possible mechanism, which is to integrate the ad-
judication of state responsibility into the reparations phase of any ICC trial in-
volving State-Enabled Crimes. This is, however, just one of several possible
mechanisms for providing an integrated response to State-Enabled Crimes.
Others may argue for alternatives. There are several possibilities, even when
just limiting the options to adjudicative mechanisms. Examples include con-
flict-specific options, such as integrating state responsibility into the reparations
phase of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, through to
more general options, such as the addition of a criminal chamber to the ICJ to
assess individual criminal responsibility concurrently with state responsibility.
Another possibility is the creation of an entirely new international institution
designed from the outset with an integrated response in mind.
More broadly, one might propose moving non-adjudicative mechanisms
of enforcement, such as activity within the U.N. Security Council sanctions
156. This solution has been offered in response to the challenge of assigning state responsibility
for genocide. See Mohamed, supra note 148, at 395. In a related manner, Michael Walzer, in describing
reparations paid through taxation, affirms that "[t]he distribution of costs is not the distribution of guilt."
WALTZER, supra note 155, at 297. See also Franck, supra note 71, at 570 (emphasizing that "a finding
of state responsibility is not tantamount to a determination of the people's collective guilt.").
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committee, toward an integrated approach to overcome the flaws of bifurcation,
even if they retain some of the due process objections raised against mecha-
nisms at the more politicized end of the enforcement spectrum. Regardless, my
goal is not to argue that adjudicating state responsibility at the ICC is necessari-
ly superior to these or other potential alternatives, but simply to demonstrate
that there is at least one feasible mechanism for enforcing an integrated re-
sponse.
The ICC is a criminal court with jurisdiction over natural persons. But at
the end of every ICC trial is a reparations phase in which, drawing on the evi-
dence presented during the criminal trial, the judges make findings on the harm
suffered by the victims and order the defendant to pay damages or make other
appropriate forms of reparation.' 57 This phase uses a standard of proof lower
than the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard that is used for the criminal part
of the proceedings. 58
The inclusion of this phase in the Rome Statute marked a novel develop-
ment for international criminal law which had, up to that point, kept its distance
from remedial claims.1 59 Under pressure from victims of international crimes
and their advocates, the drafters of the new statute decided to draw on proce-
dures from civil law countries where victims of crime play a much more signif-
icant role than they do in common law systems.160
Reflecting the lead role that French delegates played in drafting the repa-
rations provisions of the statute, the reparations phase functions much like a
"civil attachment" proceeding to a criminal trial under the French domestic sys-
tem.161 In both systems, damages can be pursued at the end of a criminal trial,
rather than having to hold a separate civil trial. Under the present ICC system, a
reparations order can only be made against the convicted criminal defendant.
But under the French criminal system, third parties that have civil, but not
criminal, liability for the crime, such as the defendant's employer, can be
157. Reparations owed by indigent defendants are paid through the Trust Fund for Victims,
which is currently funded by the voluntary contributions of both state and non-state entities and individu-
als. See Make a Donation, TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/make-donation.
This mechanism would continue to operate as it currently does under the proposal advanced below. Any
order for financial reparations against a state made after a finding of state responsibility would not come
out of the Trust Fund for Victims, but would instead come directly from the state being held accounta-
ble.
158. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA, Order for Reparations, ¶ 22 (Mar.
3, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl919026.pdf. ("Given the fundamentally different na-
ture of reparations proceedings, a standard less exacting than that for trial, where the prosecution must
establish the relevant facts to the standard of 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' should apply.").
159. See, e.g., CONOR MCCARTHY, REPARATIONS AND VICTIM SUPPORT IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 36-41 (2012).
160. Under the Rome Statute victims are assigned legal representation, which facilitates the
inclusion of their views and concerns into the trial process, even going so far as giving them the right to
present evidence to the court. See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 68. On the drafting history of the
reparations phase, see generally THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE 262 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
161. See generally Jean Larguier, Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal Procedure, 39
TUL. L. REv. 687, 694 (1965). For a more recent exposition see BERNARD BOULOC, PROCEDURE
PlNALE 191-333 (2006) (in French).
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brought into the civil attachment phase and the court can make a reparations
order against them on the basis of a finding of civil liability.162 The individual
or entity brought in under the civil attachment process does not have to be pre-
sent in the courtroom, but he or she can have legal representation throughout
the proceeding if he or she so chooses.' This largely parallels what I am pro-
posing the ICC could do by bringing a state, which likewise has non-criminal
responsibility for the crime, into the reparations phase of the criminal proceed-
ing.
Statutory guidance on the ICC reparations phase is barebones, leaving
much scope for progressive development by the judges. With the reparations
phase only occurring once criminal appeals and sentencing are complete, the
ICC has only recently reached this phase in its first case. 1 This makes it an
appropriate moment to consider using the reparations phase as a mechanism to
advance an integrated response, since little is yet set in stone. Moreover, what
groundwork that has been laid for the reparations phase is, so far, largely con-
sistent with the possibility of introducing the adjudication of state responsibility
into the process.
Nonetheless, the integration of state responsibility into the reparations
phase would require an amendment to the Rome Statute. Through the amend-
ment, States Parties would grant the Court jurisdiction over them for the pur-
poses of adjudicating state responsibility.165 Non-States Parties would have to
give their express consent before the ICC could make any adjudication that af-
fected their rights and responsibilities.1 66
What the integration of state responsibility into the reparations phase
would look like in practice is fairly straightforward. First, during the criminal
trial of an individual defendant, the judges, rather than artificially excluding ev-
idence about the role of the state from the trial, would allow this evidence in.
As a general matter, the ICC Appeals Chamber has already explicitly endorsed
the idea of the trial chamber allowing in evidence that is not relevant for deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of the individual defendant. As explained in its
February 2015 decision establishing the principles on reparations, judges in the
reparations phase should be able to rely on evidence "presented during the trial
162. Id. at 247 (explaining that the third party bearing civil liability can be summoned to the
criminal court by either the public prosecutor or the partie civile).
163. Id.
164. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA, Order for Reparations (Mar. 3,
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl919026.pdf [hereinafter Dyilo Order for Reparations].
Moreover, legal proceedings regarding the implementation of reparations are ongoing at the time of publi-
cation. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-3198 Ordonnance Enjoignant au Fonds au Profit des
Victimes de Completer le Projet de Plan de Mise en Oeuvre (Feb. 6, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs
/doc/doc2199557.pdf (requesting that the Trust Fund for Victims submit its final plan for reparations by
December 31, 2016).
165. This would likely require the addition of an article 25(1) bis, adding States to the jurisdic-
tion the court already has over natural persons and an article 75(2) bis, enabling the Court to make the
same reparation orders against States as it is allowed to make against natural persons.
166. See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Preliminary
Question, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 19,32 (1954); see also Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, 119 I.L.R. 566,1 11.17
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001) (extending the principle in Monetary Gold to international courts generally).
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... only for the purposes of reparations and which was not relied upon for fac-
tual findings relevant to the conviction and sentence of the person.",167 The
state could choose to have a legal representative present to advance its position
in this regard, just as in any other adjudication of state responsibility.
Second, judges in the reparations phase would draw on the factual record
developed by the trial chamber in the criminal proceedings to adjudicate the re-
sponsibility of the state, using the lesser standard of proof that applies to the
reparations phase-and which is closer to what the ICJ uses when it assesses
state responsibility. Third, in addition to making a reparations order against
the convicted defendant for his role in the State-Enabled Crime, the judges
could also make a reparations order against the state whenever it finds there has
been state responsibility. And just as the court is at liberty to order reparations
with a "symbolic, preventative or transformative value"169 against an individu-
al defendant, so too could it make such non-monetary reparation orders against
a state. The court could order the state to issue an apology to victims, or to es-
tablish a memorial for example. It could go further and call for the state to
launch an inquiry into the practices and policies that enabled the crimes. The
result would be a factual record that reflects the role that both individual and
state play in the commission of State-Enabled Crimes and a response from the
international legal system that reflects this dual responsibility.
1. Advantages
The general benefits of an integrated response over a bifurcated one have
been addressed above, 170 and all of them would apply to the specific proposal
advanced here. In addition, there are distinct benefits to recommend the ICC
proposal over alternative mechanisms one might imagine for achieving an inte-
grated response.
First, the integration of state responsibility into ICC proceedings offers no
significant disadvantage for individual ICC defendants, and may actually result
in outcomes that are fairer to them than under the current system.171 The ex-
plicit accounting of the role that state policies or practices played in enabling
the defendant to commit a given State-Enabled Crime provides context to the
defendant's actions. This is likely to generate a more accurate picture of his in-
dividual culpability than what results under the current system.
Second, from the perspective of the victims to ICC cases, the integration
of state responsibility expands the circle of sources from which reparations can
be sought. One benefit of this is that it may provide an essential source of fi-
167. Dyilo Order for Reparations, supra note 164, $ 156 (Mar. 3, 2015).
168. See id.; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Judgment) (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007
I.C.J. Rep. 43, 1208-10 (Feb. 26).
169. Dyilo Order for Reparations, supra note 164, ¶ 34.
170. See supra Section 1II.A.
171. The incorporation of the state's role would probably slow the pace of an individual's trial,
so there are speed-of-trial issues for individual defendants to be worried about. But these are likely to be
outweighed by the benefits they would derive from having the state's role accounted for.
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nancing for damages, relative to the alternative of a single defendant who may
be judgment proof. Another is that the state can provide forms of satisfaction to
victims that no individual can, such as an apology from the state, state-
sponsored memorials, museums, or even recommendations about the develop-
ment of educational materials, and ensuring the victims' experiences are cap-
tured for future generations.172
Beyond these concrete benefits, the symbolism arising from the world's
permanent criminal court assessing the responsibility of the state may also be
important for victims. As accounts of the civil attachment to French criminal
proceedings explain, although the third party's liability is purely civil, it takes
on a "coloration p6nale" by virtue of the origins of the act that led to the liabil-
ity.1 73 In the absence of the criminalization of state behavior being possible
under existing international law, this offers a "next-best" alternative. And from
a fair labeling perspective it has the advantage of linking state responsibility to
the exact crime, qua crime, it is responsible for.
Third, from the perspective of states, the adjudication of state responsibil-
ity at the ICC would offer an elegant way to overcome the political disincen-
tives to bringing state responsibility claims in other forums. As noted above,
there is no incentive for State A to incur the diplomatic headaches that result
from bringing a claim of state responsibility against State B for Crime X, short
of the rare instance in which State A's nationals were the victims. 74 But the
diplomatic challenges of state responsibility cases would be largely mitigated if
states could delegate to the ICC prosecutor, in advance of any particular case,
their rights to pursue state responsibility in cases where they have been unwill-
ing or unable to pursue responsibility themselves. Thus if State A, in 2016,
joins some hundred other States Parties ratifying an amendment to grant the
ICC prosecutor jurisdiction to pursue state responsibility, then it is unlikely to
face any diplomatic fallout should, in say 2020, the ICC prosecutor pursue
State B over its responsibility for Crime X. Moreover, under the proposed com-
plementarity approach detailed below, states would not lose their rights to pur-
sue state responsibility in any other forum of their choosing; the ICC would be
limited to those instances in which states have been unwilling or unable to pur-
sue the case under the law of state responsibility themselves.1 75
Finally, from an institutional perspective, integrating state responsibility
into the ICC is more efficient than alternatives that might require the establish-
ment of a brand new judicial mechanism. It is also efficient in that the attribu-
tion of state responsibility could be made by drawing on findings of fact that
are already being established in the court's criminal proceedings. And, perhaps
counter-intuitively, it may be easier for the judges presiding over the criminal
172. See also Andrea Bianchi, Serious Violations of Human Rights and Foreign States' Ac-
countability Before Municipal Courts, in MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN, supra note 69, at 149,181 (not-
ing that in circumstances where "no remedy can make good" the harm suffered, "a declaratory judgment
against the foreign State itself . .. may suffice for the purposes of doing justice").
173. BOULOC, supra note 161, at 274.
174. See supra Section II.B.3.
175. See infra Section Ill.C.2.ii.
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trial to have evidence related to state responsibility enter into their record than
it is to try and focus the record exclusively on individual responsibility for
crimes in which the state has played such an integral role.
2. Concerns
While concerns about an integrated response in general have been ad-
dressed above,176 there are five potential counter-arguments to the ICC pro-
posal specifically that are worth considering. First is the selectivity of cases
reaching the ICC and thus the selectivity of state responsibility that would flow
from that; second is the potential for overlapping adjudication given that other
forums exist for adjudicating state responsibility; third is the possibility that the
proposal would reduce the number of self-referrals the Court receives; fourth is
the question of enforceability; and the final concern relates to the political fea-
sibility of the proposal in general.
i. Selectivity
One serious concern is that state responsibility would only be incurred for
the handful of cases reaching the ICC. And even then, the Court could only ad-
judicate the responsibility of states that have consented to its jurisdiction,
whether through ratification of a statutory amendment or on an ad hoc basis.
There are two elements to this concern, the second more problematic than the
first.
The first element is that the proposal reaches only a fraction of the scenar-
ios in which state responsibility should be incurred. In most instances the
Court's jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed by the national of and/or on
the territory of signatory states: a number currently totaling 123.177 The Court
can also be given jurisdiction over cases arising from states that have not joined
the Court if the U.N. Security Council refers such a case to it. 17 Taking this
Security Council mechanism into account, the Court currently has potential ju-
risdiction over crimes committed in the territory and/or by nationals of all 193
countries in the United Nations.
The alternative international forum for adjudicating state responsibility
for State-Enabled Crimes, the ICJ, has jurisdiction over just the seventy-one
countries that have joined its compulsory jurisdiction regime, with only one of
those countries, the United Kingdom, being a permanent member of the Securi-
ty Council. 179 Overall then, if the proposal advanced here were to come into
effect, it would provide for significantly greater coverage than the existing al-
ternative. So while it is true that, short of a U.N. Security Council referral, the
ICC cannot reach all states, this is not a strong argument against the proposal
176. See supra Section I.B.
177. See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 12.
178. See id. art. 13(b).
179. See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT'L COURT
OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
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per se as much as an argument in favor of additional mechanisms to strengthen
or go beyond the proposal. In the tradition of not letting the perfect be the ene-
my of the good, any improvement upon the currently low baseline of state ac-
countability for these crimes deserves support.
The second aspect of the concern, however, is more troubling. The cases
that reach the ICC are-to a degree that is a subject of intense debate-
selective. The most notorious critique of the ICC's selectivity is that is has an
anti-Africa bias. 80 The charge carries some weight: the Court's current docket
is full of cases arising out of countries in Africa, with the sole exception being
the recent addition of an investigation in Georgia. But scratching the surface,
this reality, while causing significant perception problems, does not actually
belie any animus toward African countries on the part of the Court. Five of the
situations on the Court's Africa docket were referred to the Court by those
countries themselves, 8 ' two were referred to the Court by the U.N. Security
Council,182 and only in one situation, Kenya, did the ICC Prosecutor act under
his proprio motu powers to pursue an investigation. Meanwhile out of the sev-
en situations that the Court has under preliminary investigation, only two are in
Africa.1 83 Moreover, as the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has repeatedly
noted, cases arising out of Africa not only prosecute African defendants, they
also seek justice for African victims.
Still, there is a further selectivity concern. Any of the five permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council can veto a referral of a situation to the
ICC. This means that, in practice, the Court's jurisdiction is skewed in favor of
180. See, e.g., Aislinn Laing, International Criminal Court Is "Hunting" Africans, TELEGRAPH,
May 27, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/1 0082819/International
-Criminal-Court-is-hunting-Africans.html. But see Is Africa on Trial?, BBC, Mar. 27, 2012,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17513065; Robert Wanjala, Kenya Victims Relieved By Refusal
To Postpone ICC Cases, ALL AFRICA, Nov. 18, 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201311l90492.html.
181. Referrals were made by Uganda, Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, President of Uganda
Refers Situation Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, (Jan. 29, 2004),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/president%/20
of%20uganda%20refers%20situationOO%20conceming%20the%20lord s%20resistance%20army%20
Ira_%20to%20the%20icc.aspx; DRC, Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Prosecutor receives referral
of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, (Apr. 19, 2004), https://www.icc-cpi.int/en menus
/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/prosecutor/o20receives%20referral%20of%/o2
Othe%20situation%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%200fu/o20congo.aspx; CAR, Press Release,
Int'l Criminal Court, Prosecutor receives referral concerning Central African Republic, (Jan. 7, 2005),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2005/Pages/otp%20
prosecutor/o20receives%20referral%20conceming%20central%20african%20republic.aspx; Ivory
Coast, Reconfirming the Acceptance of the ICC Jurisdiction, Int'l Criminal Court (Dec. 14, 2010),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/498E8FEB-7A72-4005-A209-Cl4BA374804F/0/ReconCPI.pdf
Mali, Referral letter by the Government of Mali, Int'l Criminal Court (Jul. 13, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi
.int/NR/rdonlyres/A245A47F-BFDI-45B6-891C-3BCB5Bl73F57/0/ReferralLetterMalil30712.pdf.
182. See S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (Sudan); S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) (Libya).
183. Preliminary investigations are underway with respect to Afghanistan, Colombia, Nigeria,
Guinea, Iraq, Ukraine, and Palestine. See Preliminary Examinations, INT'L CRIM. COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/structure%20ofo20the%20court/office%20ofo20the%20prosecutor
/comm%20and%20ref/Pages/communications%20and%20referrals.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
184. See, e.g., David Smith, New Chief Prosecutor Defends International Criminal Court,
GUARDIAN, May 23, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/may/23/chief-prosecutor-intemational
-criminal-court.
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impunity for these five permanent members and their allies. This is an im-
portant concern. But again, it would be a mistake to throw the whole proposal
aside because of this concern. In light of the limitations facing legal mecha-
nisms for effectuating the law of state responsibility, the primary approach for
responding to the role states play in State-Enabled Crimes at present is an ad
hoc political process run at the behest of the U.N. Security Council. Criti-
cisms of this process are widespread and well covered in the literature.186 In
some cases states are sanctioned without appropriate due process concerns be-
ing addressed; in other instances, the discussion is shut down before questions
about state responsibility are even asked. Thus, even if the proposed ICC
mechanism still allowed the permanent five members of the Security Council to
give some cover to themselves and their allies, it may at least mitigate the exist-
ing ability of these powerful states to sanction their enemies without any due
process constraints whatsoever and at least ensure that the question of state re-
sponsibility would be asked as a matter of course.
ii. Overlapping Jurisdiction
There are existing courts tasked with adjudicating state responsibility.
While domestic courts cannot fulfill this task against each other, regional hu-
man rights courts and the ICJ can and do. This raises the problem of how to
deal with overlapping adjudication.i8
To the degree one accepts the normative argument advanced in this Arti-
cle, that an integrated response to State-Enabled Crimes is preferable to a bifur-
cated one, then an ICC adjudication of state responsibility should have primacy
over the alternatives. This is a position that regional courts and the ICJ could
adopt and implement through a policy of deference. But even if these other
courts did not grant the ICC primacy, there are other options available to avoid
concurrent adjudication.
Informally, the ICC could use existing statutory provisions to justify a
decision not to pursue state responsibility, such as by reference to the principles
of cooperation listed in Part IX of the Rome Statute. More formally, States Par-
ties could pass a statutory amendment to ensure that the pursuit of state respon-
sibility could be declined under the generic "interests of justice" provision that
currently serves a catch-all function for prosecutorial discretion to decline crim-
inal cases.1ss Finally, States Parties could amend the statute to implement a
system of complementarity as exists at the ICC for criminal cases. There are a
number of ways this could be configured, but the most straightforward would
simply be to replicate the approach to criminal cases thereby ensuring that the
ICC would not adjudicate state responsibility against a given state when there is
185. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., supra note 154 and accompanying text.
187. But see Pamela Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, NOTRE
DAME L. REV (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author) (framing overlapping jurisdiction as a positive
phenomenon).
188. See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 53(1)(c).
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already a state responsibility case against that state for substantially the same
conduct. 189
iii. Undermining Self-Referrals
A further concern is that many of the ICC's cases currently come from
situations that States Parties have themselves referred to the Court, in which the
state asks the Court to adjudicate acts committed on its territory (so-called
"self-referrals"). If states knew that the ICC could hold not just individuals but
also the state responsible for the State-Enabled Crimes committed on its territo-
ry responsible, they may be reluctant to make self-referrals.
Of course, states making self-referrals already know the ICC can, in theo-
ry at least, hold state officials, up to and including the head of state, criminally
responsible for acts committed on the territory of the state making the self-
referral. Thus one might argue that the additional possibility of non-criminal
responsibility for the state would be unlikely to alter the existing calculus for
those officials considering a self-referral. Yet an integrated response may none-
theless give state officials pause.
While the Court has been willing to seek the arrest of sitting presidents in
Sudan and Kenya, neither of these situations were self-referrals. At present,
state officials may be assuming that a self-referral provides an implied free pass
for crimes in which the state was involved. And under an integrated system,
whereby the role of the state is considered as a matter of course, such an as-
sumption would become implausible. As a result, it is possible that the Court
would receive fewer self-referrals under an integrated approach than it does
under the existing system. But whether or not self-referral is a good way for the
Court to obtain jurisdiction is itself a fraught topic.190 As the debate over self-
referrals plays out, the possibility of fewer self-referrals is not a strong reason
to oppose an integrated response, and for some it may even be a reason to sup-
port it.191
189. This test of "substantially the same conduct" is grounded in Article 17(a) of the Rome
Statute, which precludes the court from admitting a case that is being pursued by a state with jurisdiction
over it. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr.
Germain Katanga Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility
of the Case, ¶ 16 (Sept. 25, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc746819.pdf. Initially, the
Court interpreted the Article as covering instances in which the same person was being prosecuted for
the same conduct. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for Warrants of Arrest, art. 58, 131 (Feb. 10, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
530350.pdf. However, the Court subsequently modified the test to also exclude cases where the conduct
being prosecuted by a national court is "substantially the same." See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No.
ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled "Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute," ¶ 40 (Aug. 30,
2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl223134.pdf (emphasis added).
190. See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, The Controversy over Territorial State Referrals and Reflec-
tions on ICL Discourse, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 355 (2011).
191. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary
Thoughts, 19 CluM. L. F. 5 (2008) (arguing that the kind of cooperative relationship between the ICC
and a state that is present in instances of self-referral is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
Rome Statute).
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iv. Enforcement
The ICC does not have its own police force. It relies on states to enforce
its decisions. In this, the ICC is no different from other international or regional
courts. But this lack of enforcement power can clearly be a problem, as evident
in the difficulty the ICC has in getting some of its decisions on individual re-
sponsibility enforced. 192
Still, whenever the ICJ or the regional human rights courts issue findings
of state responsibility, they too rely on states to enforce any remedial orders
they make. And there is no reason to think that it would be more difficult for
the ICC to get its decisions on state responsibility enforced than it is for these
other courts under the bifurcated structure of the existing system. Thus, en-
forcement of orders relating to state responsibility under the integrated mecha-
nism proposed here would be no weaker than under the existing system.
Nonetheless, while one would not expect the rate of enforcement of state
responsibility through the ICC to be markedly different from the enforcement
of state responsibility in other forums, it is reasonable to be concerned with the
risk of asymmetric enforcement at the ICC. That is to say, ICC judgments
against states may be under-enforced relative to ICC judgments against indi-
viduals. There is no ready fix for this risk. At the end of the day, the enforce-
ment of all international legal judgments takes place against a backdrop of state
power. But this proposal would at least make the disparities between the en-
forcement of accountability against the individual relative to against the state
visible. At present, when State-Enabled Crimes occur, individuals are pursued
at the ICC without any mention of the state's role required. Thus, even if state
responsibility at the ICC were under-enforced relative to individual responsibil-
ity, there would at least be light shed on the responsibility of the state as a mat-
ter of routine.
v. Political feasibility
Finally, skeptics may question the political feasibility of an amendment to
the Rome Statute. Indeed, the procedural hurdles to the passage of an amend-
ment are significant. A proposed amendment must first receive the blessing of
two-thirds of the States Parties to the Statute. 193 And even then, the amend-
ment will only come into force once seven-eighths of all the Parties have rati-
fied it.1 94 Still, these hurdles have not stopped two proposed amendments al-
ready moving forward, one to ensure the provisions on the use of chemical
weapons as a war crime in situations of international armed conflict also apply
to situations of non-international armed conflict, 195 and the other to define, and
192. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Omar al-Bashir, Leaving South Africa, Eludes Arrest Again,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15,2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/omar-hassan-al-bashir-sudan
-south-africa.html.
193. Rome Statute supra note 18, art. 121(3).
194. Id. art. 121(4)-(5).
195. INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 8 OF THE ROME STATUTE, Annex I,
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thus operationalize, the crime of aggression.196 Thus an amendment does not
seem, per se, implausible.
Beyond the procedural requirements of an amendment in general terms
however, one may still question the feasibility of this amendment in particular.
The suggestion that states grant the Court jurisdiction to make findings of re-
sponsibility and order remedial measures against them seems both radical and
naive. Yet compared to giving the Court criminal jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression, thereby enabling the Court to adjudicate actions so quintessentially
associated with the state as the use of armed force is, the suggestion of a state
responsibility amendment seems tame.1 97 Of course, closer scrutiny of the ag-
gression amendment suggests the matter is not quite so easily dismissed. The
amendment ensures that the U.N. Security Council retains ultimate control over
the determination of whether or not an act of aggression has occurred in the
first place. Only once that bar is passed is the Court given free rein to adjudi-
cate the matter. So while it is indeed true that the weakest States Parties, those
who are not permanent members of the U.N. Security Council or allies of them,
have ceded control over the adjudication of the crime of aggression, the same
cannot be said for powerful states. The lesson here is that the ICC is no more
immune than any other international institution from the observation that inter-
national law often replicates existing power hierarchies.' 98
The pursuit of an amendment to achieve the integrated enforcement
mechanism proposed here would in all likelihood be subjected to these prevail-
ing power dynamics. The probable end result is that weaker states would be
held responsible for their role in State-Enabled Crimes more often than power-
ful states. This is unquestionably a problem. But the fact that this proposal can-
not upend the power dynamics of the international legal order is not sufficient
grounds to reject it. The benefits of an integrated response for victims and de-
fendants remain, even if its application is imperfect.
CONCLUSION
The analytical category of State-Enabled Crimes draws attention to the
convergence of individual and state responsibility in the commission of many
international crimes. I have used State-Enabled Crimes to highlight the mis-
match between the integrated responsibility inherent in the commission of these
crimes and the bifurcated nature of the international legal system's response to
them. And I have argued that this bifurcated approach generates a distorted pic-
Proposed art. 8.2(e)(xiii)-(xv) (2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG
.pdf.
196. INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, Annex I, Proposed art. 8 bis (2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf
197. See generally RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 122, at 125-128 (detailing the historical
reluctance of States to put "legal constraints of a criminal form on their use of force").
198. See Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shap-
ing of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 371 (2005) (describing the efforts of pow-
erful states to "reshap[e] the international legal order so as to better reflect and accommodate superiority
in power").
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ture of how these crimes are committed and risks an unfair allocation of re-
sponsibility between individual and state.
In this sense, this Article supplements existing scholarship concerned
with the unsatisfactory response of the international legal system to the worst
crimes that humanity has to offer. For some, the task ahead is to extend the
reach of international criminal law to more individuals through theories of
group criminality, although existing efforts in this regard have had mixed re-
sults. For others, the state's role in international crime demands a revival of the
conversation about holding states criminally liable. But as a matter of political
realism, any such development seems a long way off, even for those convinced
of its merits. Where this Article distinguishes itself is in the recognition that we
already have at our disposal two bodies of law which, if enforced through the
integrated mechanism proposed, or indeed through alternatives that others may
suggest, would mark a significant improvement over the status quo, yielding
benefits on the dimensions of prevention, peace and reconciliation, and retribu-
tion.
By proposing reforms to account for the various situational factors under-
pinning the perpetration of international crimes and holding the organizations
responsible for perpetuating these situational factors to account, it may be pos-
sible to build a regime that addresses many of the prevailing critiques concern-
ing the discord between international crimes and the mechanisms of accounta-
bility for them. This Article has focused on instances where the enabling
organization is in the form of the state. And there are good reasons for starting
with the state. But other entities-non-state armed groups, corporations, and
even international organizations-should also be brought into view. The inter-
national legal system's approach to accountability for the enabling role played
by these other organizations is an important topic for future research.
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